Evolutionary Game on Development Decision of Poverty Alleviation Photovoltaic in Northwest China

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202212047

Abstract

Abstract:

Despite the fact that the new model of distributed photovoltaic development in the whole county has offered a fresh approach to solving the problems such as difficult absorption, serious abandonment of photovoltaic power and decentralized poverty alleviation efforts amid the commitment to "carbon peak and carbon neutrality", the problem of multi-subject decision-making among all stakeholders in photovoltaic poverty alleviation in the whole county market has become the top priority of the current poverty alleviation power station market operation. Based on the evolutionary game theory, a four-party evolutionary game model involving users, state-owned enterprises (including the State Grid), photovoltaic enterprises and the government is constructed, with the multi-subject decision-making evolution and parameter influence of photovoltaic poverty alleviation market in Gansu Province, Qinghai Province and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region studied. The results show that the equilibrium strategies of state-owned enterprises and photovoltaic enterprises are all positive, but the equilibrium results and time between users and the government are also different due to the differences in light resources, electricity prices and electricity consumption in various areas. The photovoltaic market in Gansu Province is balanced in the strategy set built by users without government subsidies. Areas with more abundant sunshine and significant government subsidies report considerable income from photovoltaic poverty alleviation, which means stronger users interest in investment and shorter time to achieve equilibrium; cost saving and rent reduction are effective measures to improve the equilibrium path in Northwest China.

Key words: photovoltaic poverty alleviation, whole county model, synergy mechanism, four-dimensional evolutionary game, path

Ning LIU, Chi ZHANG, Dong WANG, Mingjie YANG. Evolutionary Game on Development Decision of Poverty Alleviation Photovoltaic in Northwest China[J]. Electric Power, 2024, 57(2): 149-160.

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URL: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202212047

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/Y2024/V57/I2/149

Figures/Tables 11

References 18

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博弈主体策略及收益		用户自建光伏(x)		用户出租屋顶(1–x)
博弈主体策略及收益		国有企业合作(y)	国有企业不合作(1–y)	国有企业合作(y)	国有企业不合作(1–y)
光伏企业安装(z)	政府补贴(w)	P₂Q₂–(1–T)C–M; (1–t₁)(P₁–P₂)Q₂; (1–t₂)(C+M–C₀); t₁(P₁–P₂)Q₂+t₂(C+M–C₀)–TC	–(1–T)C–M; 0; (1–t₂)(C+M–C₀); t₂(C+M–C₀)–TC	R–aP₁Q₁; (1–t₁)(P₁–P₂)Q₂; (1–t₂)(aP₁Q₁+P₂Q₂+TC–C₀–R); t₁(P₁–P₂)Q₂+t₂(aP₁Q₁+P₂Q₂+TC– C₀–R)–TC	R–aP₁Q₁; 0; (1–t₂)(aP₁Q₁+TC–C₀–R); t₂(aP₁Q₁+TC–C₀–R)–TC
光伏企业安装(z)	政府不补贴(1–w)	P₂Q₂–C–M; (1–t₁)(P₁–P₂)Q₂; (1–t₂)(C+M–C₀); t₁(P₁–P₂)Q₂+t₂(C+M–C₀)–C_G	–C–M; 0; (1–t₂)(C+M–C₀); t₂(C+M–C₀)–C_G	R–aP₁Q₁; (1–t₁)(P₁–P₂)Q₂; (1–t₂)(aP₁Q₁+P₂Q₂–C₀–R); t₁(P₁–P₂)Q₂+t₂(aP₁Q₁+P₂Q₂–C₀– R)–C_G	R–aP₁Q₁; 0; (1–t₂)(aP₁Q₁–C₀–R); t₂(aP₁Q₁–C₀–R)–C_G
光伏企业不安装(1–z)	政府补贴(w)	P₂Q₂–(1–T)C–M; (1–t₁)((P₁–P₂)Q₂+C+M–C₀); 0; t₁((P₁–P₂)Q₂+C+M–C₀)–TC	–(1–T)C–M; (1–t₁)(C+M–C₀); 0; t₁(C+M–C₀)–TC	R–aP₁Q₁; (1–t₁)(aP₁Q₁+P₁Q₂+TC–C₀–R); 0; t₁(aP₁Q₁+P₁Q₂+TC–C₀–R)–TC	R–aP₁Q₁; (1–t₁)(aP₁Q₁+TC–C₀–R); 0; t₁(aP₁Q₁+TC–C₀–R)–TC
光伏企业不安装(1–z)	政府不补贴(1–w)	P₂Q₂–C–M; (1–t₁)((P₁–P₂)Q₂+C+M–C₀); 0; t₁((P₁–P₂)Q₂+C+M–C₀)–C_G	–P₁Q₁; (1–t₁)P₁Q₁; 0; t₁P₁Q₁–C_G	R–aP₁Q₁; (1–t₁)(aP₁Q₁+P₁Q₂–C₀–R); 0; t₁(aP₁Q₁+P₁Q₂–C₀–R)–C_G	–P₁Q₁; (1–t₁)P₁Q₁; 0; t₁(P₁Q₂–C₀–R)–C_G

博弈主体策略及收益		用户自建光伏(x)		用户出租屋顶(1–x)
博弈主体策略及收益		国有企业合作(y)	国有企业不合作(1–y)	国有企业合作(y)	国有企业不合作(1–y)
光伏企业安装(z)	政府补贴(w)	P₂Q₂–(1–T)C–M; (1–t₁)(P₁–P₂)Q₂; (1–t₂)(C+M–C₀); t₁(P₁–P₂)Q₂+t₂(C+M–C₀)–TC	–(1–T)C–M; 0; (1–t₂)(C+M–C₀); t₂(C+M–C₀)–TC	R–aP₁Q₁; (1–t₁)(P₁–P₂)Q₂; (1–t₂)(aP₁Q₁+P₂Q₂+TC–C₀–R); t₁(P₁–P₂)Q₂+t₂(aP₁Q₁+P₂Q₂+TC– C₀–R)–TC	R–aP₁Q₁; 0; (1–t₂)(aP₁Q₁+TC–C₀–R); t₂(aP₁Q₁+TC–C₀–R)–TC
光伏企业安装(z)	政府不补贴(1–w)	P₂Q₂–C–M; (1–t₁)(P₁–P₂)Q₂; (1–t₂)(C+M–C₀); t₁(P₁–P₂)Q₂+t₂(C+M–C₀)–C_G	–C–M; 0; (1–t₂)(C+M–C₀); t₂(C+M–C₀)–C_G	R–aP₁Q₁; (1–t₁)(P₁–P₂)Q₂; (1–t₂)(aP₁Q₁+P₂Q₂–C₀–R); t₁(P₁–P₂)Q₂+t₂(aP₁Q₁+P₂Q₂–C₀– R)–C_G	R–aP₁Q₁; 0; (1–t₂)(aP₁Q₁–C₀–R); t₂(aP₁Q₁–C₀–R)–C_G
光伏企业不安装(1–z)	政府补贴(w)	P₂Q₂–(1–T)C–M; (1–t₁)((P₁–P₂)Q₂+C+M–C₀); 0; t₁((P₁–P₂)Q₂+C+M–C₀)–TC	–(1–T)C–M; (1–t₁)(C+M–C₀); 0; t₁(C+M–C₀)–TC	R–aP₁Q₁; (1–t₁)(aP₁Q₁+P₁Q₂+TC–C₀–R); 0; t₁(aP₁Q₁+P₁Q₂+TC–C₀–R)–TC	R–aP₁Q₁; (1–t₁)(aP₁Q₁+TC–C₀–R); 0; t₁(aP₁Q₁+TC–C₀–R)–TC
光伏企业不安装(1–z)	政府不补贴(1–w)	P₂Q₂–C–M; (1–t₁)((P₁–P₂)Q₂+C+M–C₀); 0; t₁((P₁–P₂)Q₂+C+M–C₀)–C_G	–P₁Q₁; (1–t₁)P₁Q₁; 0; t₁P₁Q₁–C_G	R–aP₁Q₁; (1–t₁)(aP₁Q₁+P₁Q₂–C₀–R); 0; t₁(aP₁Q₁+P₁Q₂–C₀–R)–C_G	–P₁Q₁; (1–t₁)P₁Q₁; 0; t₁(P₁Q₂–C₀–R)–C_G

均衡点	$ {\lambda _1} $	$ {\lambda _2} $	$ {\lambda _3} $	$ {\lambda _4} $
$ {E_1}(0,0,0,0) $	0	(t₁–1)(C₀+R–P₁Q₂+(1–a)P₁Q₁)	(t₂–1)(C₀+R–aP₁Q₁)	C_G–t₁(–CT–P₁Q₁a+P₁Q₂)–CT
$ {E_2}(1,0,0,0) $	0	–(t₁–1)(C–C₀+M+Q₂(P₁–P₂)–P₁Q₁)	0	C_G+t₁(C–C₀+M–P₁Q₁)–CT
$ {E_3}(0,1,0,0) $	P₂Q₂–M–R–C+P₁Q₁a	–(t₁–1)(C₀+R–P₁Q₂+(1–a)P₁Q₁)	(t₂–1)(2C₀+R–P₂Q₂–P₁Q₁a–C–M)	C_G+(t₁–1)CT
$ {E_4}(0,0,1,0) $	P₁Q₁a–M–R–C	–Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	–(t₂–1)(C₀+R–aP₁Q₁)	C_G+(t₂–1)CT
$ {E_5}(0,0,0,1) $	C(T–1)–R–M+P₁Q₁a	–(t₁–1)(P₁Q₂)	(t₂–1)(C₀+R–CT–P₁Q₁a)	t₁(–CT–P₁Q₁a+P₁Q₂)+CT–C_G
$ {E_6}(1,1,0,0) $	–P₂Q₂+M+R+C–P₁Q₁a	(t₁–1)(C–C₀+M+Q₂(P₁–P₂)–P₁Q₁)	–(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	C_G–CT
$ {E_7}(1,0,1,0) $	C+M+R–P₁Q₁a	–Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	0	C_G–CT
$ {E_8}(1,0,0,1) $	M+R–C(T–1)–P₁Q₁a	–(t₁–1)(Q₂(P₁–P₂))	–(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	–C_G–t₁(C–C₀+M–P₁Q₁)+CT
$ {E_9}(0,1,1,0) $	P₂Q₂–M–R–C+P₁Q₁a	Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	(1–t₂)(2C₀+R–P₂Q₂–P₁Q₁a–C–M)	–(1–t₂)CT+C_G
$ {E_{10}}(0,1,0,1) $	P₂Q₂–R–M+C(T–1)+P₁Q₁a	(t₁–1)(P₁Q₂)	–(t₂–1)(P₂Q₂–R–C₀+CT+P₁Q₁a)	–C_G–(t₁–1)CT
$ {E_{11}}(0,0,1,1) $	C(T–1)–R–M+P₁Q₁a	–Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	–(t₂–1)(C₀+R–CT–P₁Q₁a)	–C_G–(t₂–1)CT
$ {E_{12}}(1,1,1,0) $	–P₂Q₂+M+R+C–P₁Q₁a	Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	C_G–CT
$ {E_{13}}(1,0,1,1) $	–C(T–1)+R+M–P₁Q₁a	–Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	–C_G+CT
$ {E_{14}}(1,1,0,1) $	–P₂Q₂+R+M–C(T–1)–P₁Q₁a	(t₁–1)(Q₂(P₁–P₂))	–(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	–C_G+CT
$ {E_{15}}(0,1,1,1) $	P₂Q₂–R–M+C(T–1)+P₁Q₁a	Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	(t₂–1)(P₂Q₂–R–C₀+CT+P₁Q₁a)	(1–t₂)CT–C_G
$ {E_{16}}(1,1,1,1) $	–P₂Q₂+R+M–C(T–1)–P₁Q₁a	Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	–C_G+CT

均衡点	$ {\lambda _1} $	$ {\lambda _2} $	$ {\lambda _3} $	$ {\lambda _4} $
$ {E_1}(0,0,0,0) $	0	(t₁–1)(C₀+R–P₁Q₂+(1–a)P₁Q₁)	(t₂–1)(C₀+R–aP₁Q₁)	C_G–t₁(–CT–P₁Q₁a+P₁Q₂)–CT
$ {E_2}(1,0,0,0) $	0	–(t₁–1)(C–C₀+M+Q₂(P₁–P₂)–P₁Q₁)	0	C_G+t₁(C–C₀+M–P₁Q₁)–CT
$ {E_3}(0,1,0,0) $	P₂Q₂–M–R–C+P₁Q₁a	–(t₁–1)(C₀+R–P₁Q₂+(1–a)P₁Q₁)	(t₂–1)(2C₀+R–P₂Q₂–P₁Q₁a–C–M)	C_G+(t₁–1)CT
$ {E_4}(0,0,1,0) $	P₁Q₁a–M–R–C	–Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	–(t₂–1)(C₀+R–aP₁Q₁)	C_G+(t₂–1)CT
$ {E_5}(0,0,0,1) $	C(T–1)–R–M+P₁Q₁a	–(t₁–1)(P₁Q₂)	(t₂–1)(C₀+R–CT–P₁Q₁a)	t₁(–CT–P₁Q₁a+P₁Q₂)+CT–C_G
$ {E_6}(1,1,0,0) $	–P₂Q₂+M+R+C–P₁Q₁a	(t₁–1)(C–C₀+M+Q₂(P₁–P₂)–P₁Q₁)	–(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	C_G–CT
$ {E_7}(1,0,1,0) $	C+M+R–P₁Q₁a	–Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	0	C_G–CT
$ {E_8}(1,0,0,1) $	M+R–C(T–1)–P₁Q₁a	–(t₁–1)(Q₂(P₁–P₂))	–(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	–C_G–t₁(C–C₀+M–P₁Q₁)+CT
$ {E_9}(0,1,1,0) $	P₂Q₂–M–R–C+P₁Q₁a	Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	(1–t₂)(2C₀+R–P₂Q₂–P₁Q₁a–C–M)	–(1–t₂)CT+C_G
$ {E_{10}}(0,1,0,1) $	P₂Q₂–R–M+C(T–1)+P₁Q₁a	(t₁–1)(P₁Q₂)	–(t₂–1)(P₂Q₂–R–C₀+CT+P₁Q₁a)	–C_G–(t₁–1)CT
$ {E_{11}}(0,0,1,1) $	C(T–1)–R–M+P₁Q₁a	–Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	–(t₂–1)(C₀+R–CT–P₁Q₁a)	–C_G–(t₂–1)CT
$ {E_{12}}(1,1,1,0) $	–P₂Q₂+M+R+C–P₁Q₁a	Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	C_G–CT
$ {E_{13}}(1,0,1,1) $	–C(T–1)+R+M–P₁Q₁a	–Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	–C_G+CT
$ {E_{14}}(1,1,0,1) $	–P₂Q₂+R+M–C(T–1)–P₁Q₁a	(t₁–1)(Q₂(P₁–P₂))	–(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	–C_G+CT
$ {E_{15}}(0,1,1,1) $	P₂Q₂–R–M+C(T–1)+P₁Q₁a	Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	(t₂–1)(P₂Q₂–R–C₀+CT+P₁Q₁a)	(1–t₂)CT–C_G
$ {E_{16}}(1,1,1,1) $	–P₂Q₂+R+M–C(T–1)–P₁Q₁a	Q₂(P₁–P₂)(t₁–1)	(t₂–1)(C–C₀+M)	–C_G+CT

地区	C/万元	Q₁/ (MW·h)	Q₂/ (MW·h)	P₁/ (元·(kW·h)^–1)	P₂/ (元·(kW·h)^–1)	M/万元	R/万元	C₀/万元	t₁	t₂	T	C_G/万元	a
甘肃省	14.050	15.810	54.320	0.5100	0.307 8	2.450	5.400	7.000	0.130	0.100	0.213 2	1.000	0.900
青海省	14.050	16.310	45.360	0.377 1	0.324 7	2.450	5.400	7.000	0.130	0.100	0.031 2	1.000	0.900
宁夏	14.050	12.270	58.540	0.448 6	0.259 5	2.450	5.400	7.000	0.130	0.100	0.128 0	1.000	0.900