中国电力 ›› 2020, Vol. 53 ›› Issue (8): 173-181.DOI: 10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201903101

• 技术经济 • 上一篇    下一篇

不同投资模式下计及缺电率约束的微网容量配置博弈分析

金顺平1, 房方1, 朱仲晏2, 刘吉臻3   

  1. 1. 华北电力大学 控制与计算机工程学院,北京 102206;
    2. 浙江缙云抽水蓄能有限公司,浙江 丽水 321400;
    3. 新能源电力系统国家重点实验室(华北电力大学),北京 102206
  • 收稿日期:2019-03-25 修回日期:2020-01-10 发布日期:2020-08-05
  • 作者简介:金顺平(1995-),男,硕士研究生,从事电力系统能源综合利用研究,E-mail:jinshunping@ncepu.edu.cn;房方(1976-),男,通信作者,博士,教授,从事发电过程建模、控制与优化研究,E-mail:ffang@ncepu.edu.cn;朱仲晏(1995-),男,硕士研究生,从事电力系统能源综合利用研究,E-mail:zhuzyncepu@163.com;刘吉臻(1951-),男,博士,教授,中国工程院院士,从事智能发电理论与技术研究,E-mail:ljz@ncepu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划政府间国际科技创新合作重点专项项目(面向可再生能源消纳的灵活性电热泵供热系统及电-热综合调控技术研究,2018YFE0106600)

Game Analysis of Microgrid Capacity Configuration for Different Investment Modes Constrained by Loss of Power Supply Probability

JIN Shunping1, FANG Fang1, ZHU Zhongyan2, LIU Jizhen3   

  1. 1. School of Control and Computer Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China;
    2. Zhejiang Jinyun Pumped Storage Co., Ltd., Lishui 321400, China;
    3. State Key Laboratory of Alternate Electrical Power System with Renewable Energy Sources (North China Electric Power University), Beijing 102206, China
  • Received:2019-03-25 Revised:2020-01-10 Published:2020-08-05
  • Supported by:
    This work is supported by National Key Research and Development Plan of China (Using Flexible District Heating with Heat Pumps for Integrated Electricity and Heat Dispatch with Renewables (Heat4RES), No.2018YFE0106600)

摘要: 为提高独立风光储微网的经济效益和供电可靠性,需要合理配置风、光、储设备的容量。在未来微网运行的市场化模式下,若风、光、储设备属于不同投资者,可能造成微网整体运行最优与投资者追求各自利益最优之间存在矛盾。为此,基于博弈论中的纯策略纳什均衡和主从博弈相关原理,以风、光、储各自设备运行寿命内的年平均收益为优化目标,以缺电率作为可靠性约束,分别建立非合作,风、光主导和风电主导3种博弈模型,求解最优风光储容量配置。根据算例结果和缺电率的敏感性分析,验证了所建立博弈模型的合理性和有效性。

关键词: 独立风光储微网, 缺电率, 纯策略纳什均衡, 主从博弈, 容量配置

Abstract: To enhance the economy and reliability of an isolated wind/solar/storage microgrid, it is necessary to configure the capacity of microgrid reasonably. However, because of the complicate ownerships of the wind turbines, the photovoltaics and the storage batteries held by different investors, the conflicts may take place between the global optimal operation of the microgrid and the pursuit of individual interest of each investor. To comply with the market management mode of the future microgrid operation, three kinds of game models (i.e., the non-cooperative game model, the wind and photovoltaic power dominant game model, and the wind power dominant game model) are established respectively, which are based on the correlation principles of the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg competition strategy of the game theory. The maximization of annual average income within the operating life cycle of the equipment is taken as the optimization objective subject to the loss of power supply probability as the reliability constraint. Then with regards to the above three models, the optimal capacity configuration of the wind/solar/storage microgrid are solved. According to the case study results and sensitivity analysis of the loss of power supply probability, the reasonableness and effectiveness of the proposed models are verified.

Key words: isolated wind/solar/storage microgrid, loss of power supply probability, pure strategy Nash equilibrium, stackelberg game, capacity configuration