Abstract: The renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are the target mechanism for the transition of China’s current renewable energy policy from the feed-in premium (FIP) to the combined action of government policies and market mechanisms. With the deepening of power system reform, renewable energy policy directly influences the game behavior of power supply chain subjects, resulting in different policy effects. Therefore, we assume the consumer side as the assessment subject of quota obligations and introduce a penalty function, and a two-level Nash equilibrium game model for the power supply chain is constructed, including the power generation side and the consumer side. The model sets three policy scenarios, i.e., FIP, RPS, and the parallel dual-track system of the two policies, and numerical simulations focus on analyzing the impact of quota and penalty parameter changes on the optimal power transaction volumes of each game subject and the price of the green certificate under RPS. Additionally, considering the welfare effect of policies, the differences in social welfare under three policy scenarios are compared. The results indicate that under RPS, the power transaction volume of renewable energy and the price of the green certificate increase initially and decrease afterward as the quota grows and increase as the penalty parameter rises. Under three policy scenarios, the social welfare function presents inverted U-shaped distribution with the increase in quotas. As the market share of renewable energy grows, the level of social welfare under the parallel dual-track system of the two policies is better than that under the implementation of the two policies separately.

Key words: power supply chain, game model, renewable energy, green certificate, social welfare