Price Decision Optimization for Electricity Retailers Based on Dual Game under Carbon Constraints

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202309065

Abstract

Abstract:

Under carbon constraints, multiple retailers competing for sale of electricity and multiple users purchasing electricity in the market bring challenges to electricity retailers in setting their selling price to increase their own profits. Thereby, a dual game price decision optimization model for multiple electricity retailers competing for sale of electricity and multiple users purchasing electricity is proposed to address the issue of retail electricity pricing under carbon constraints. Firstly, a decision-making model for each market participant is established. Secondly, a dual game framework is established for electricity retailers, in which non-cooperative games are formed among electricity retailers, and master-slave games are formed between retailers and users. And then, the loop nested solver IPOPT is used to solve the dual game problem of retailers. Finally, the proposed model is validated and analyzed through simulation examples. The simulation shows that the retailers can realize their profit maximization through the proposed model to optimize reasonable electricity selling price, and at the same time the users can obtain the optimal electricity purchase strategy through the game model to improve their comprehensive satisfaction of electricity consumption.

Key words: electricity retailers, dual game, carbon constraints, price decision, demand response

Fangshu LI, Kun YU, Xingying CHEN, Haochen HUA. Price Decision Optimization for Electricity Retailers Based on Dual Game under Carbon Constraints[J]. Electric Power, 2024, 57(5): 126-136.

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URL: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202309065

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/Y2024/V57/I5/126

Figures/Tables 13

References 29

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用户	$ {\alpha _m} $	$ {\beta _m} $
1	0.0005	0.15
2	0.0015	0.16
3	0.0010	0.15
4	0.0013	0.12

用户	$ {\alpha _m} $	$ {\beta _m} $
1	0.0005	0.15
2	0.0015	0.16
3	0.0010	0.15
4	0.0013	0.12

零售商		数值
火电零售商1 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},1}} $/(MW·h)		1400
火电零售商2 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},2}} $/(MW·h)		1350
火电零售商3 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},3}} $/(MW·h)		1240
火电零售商4 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},4}} $/(MW·h)		1110
绿电零售商1 $ {\bar q _{{\rm f},1}} $/(MW·h)		1250
绿电零售商2 $ {\bar q _{{\rm f},2}} $/(MW·h)		1280

零售商		数值
火电零售商1 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},1}} $/(MW·h)		1400
火电零售商2 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},2}} $/(MW·h)		1350
火电零售商3 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},3}} $/(MW·h)		1240
火电零售商4 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},4}} $/(MW·h)		1110
绿电零售商1 $ {\bar q _{{\rm f},1}} $/(MW·h)		1250
绿电零售商2 $ {\bar q _{{\rm f},2}} $/(MW·h)		1280

参数		数值
火电零售商购火电的价格 $ {p_{\rm g}} $/(元·(MW·h)^–1)		37
绿电零售商购绿电的价格 $ {p_{\rm f}} $/(元·(MW·h)^–1)		45
碳排放权价格 $ {p_{\rm c}} $/(元·t^–1)		40
碳配额比例 $ \lambda $		0.4
电力零售商价格调整步长 $ \eta $		0.01