Smart Grid Control Attack Defense Based on Semantic Analysis in Industrial Control Operation and Maintenance

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201904065

Abstract

Abstract: To reduce the threat of control-related attacks on the smart grid, a semantic analysis framework is proposed in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, in which the smart grid information and physical industrial control equipment are used to detect and defend against such attacks. Firstly, the control network is monitored to identify the control commands. Also the semantics and updated measurements related to the control commands are extracted from the network so as to evaluate the physical consequences of the commands. Then through the application of the general self-adaptive power flow analysis algorithm, the semantics information is extracted from the control commands to adjust the parameters. Case studies are carried out on the IEEE 24-node, 28-node and 38-node system and a 2 730-node system respectively. The results show that, compared with AC algorithm, the proposed algorithm reduces the detection delay of 24-node and 38-node systems by about 50% and that of 2 730-node systems by 66%. The average fault alarm rate is 0.01%, and the fault dismissal rate is 0.78% at the worst case.

Key words: smart grid, SCADA, semantic analysis framework, industrial control equipment, power flow analysis

MA Jianzhong, HU Kaibo, YU Lifeng. Smart Grid Control Attack Defense Based on Semantic Analysis in Industrial Control Operation and Maintenance[J]. Electric Power, 2020, 53(9): 214-220.

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URL: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201904065

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/Y2020/V53/I9/214

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