Abstract: To solve the absorption problem caused by large-scale wind power grid connection, under condition of fairness, the criteria to determine paid and unpaid peak-shaving units is set up for different types of units based on the capacity of thermal power units and their maximum peak-rates. The peaking evolutionary behavior of thermal power units can be transformed into the evolutionary game between electricity bidding and peaking auxiliary service revenue. Under the context of two market scenarios, the bidding strategy and the corresponding revenue of all kinds of thermal power plants are discussed comprehensively, then corresponding stability strategy is solved respectively. The game problem of two kinds of power plants is analyzed empirically. It is shown that at the current stage there is a huge gap between the compensation amount of peak-shaving auxiliary service and the revenue of the on-grid electricity, which will exist for some time in the future. Therefore it is becoming urgent to establish reasonable auxiliary service market and promote the positiveness of peak regulations of thermal power units so as to improve the ability for absorbing large-scale wind power generation.

Key words: wind power integration, wind power consumption, incentive mechanism, thermal power peak regulation, evolutionary game