Evolutionary Game Study of the Cooperation Mode Between Renewable Energy Generation Enterprises and Energy Storage Companies Considering Government Intervention

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202404001

Abstract

Abstract:

Driven by the policy of new energy distribution and storage, renewable energy generation enterprises are equipped with energy storage facilities to improve the stability of energy supply, but the actual utilization efficiency of energy storage power stations often fails to meet expectations. By introducing the local government as the main body, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, renewable energy generation enterprises and energy storage companies, studies the influence of local government intervention on promoting the cooperation between renewable energy generation enterprises and energy storage companies, analyzes the dynamic evolution process of the tripartite strategy and its game equilibrium strategy, and conducts simulation analysis. The results show that: firstly, the appropriate intervention of local government is helpful to promote the cooperation mode of "crowdfunding co-construction" and "capacity leasing" between renewable energy generation enterprises and energy storage companies; secondly, local government can flexibly adjust the subsidy intensity according to the changes in the cooperation willingness of both parties; thirdly, local government's intervention can effectively promote the establishment of cooperation between the two sides. With the in-depth development of cooperation, local government should reduce direct intervention in due course and let market mechanisms play a greater role. This research result has theoretical and practical significance for optimizing new energy distribution and storage policies and promoting the healthy development of renewable energy industry.

Key words: renewable energy generation enterprises, new energy distribution and storage, evolutionary game, energy storage companies, government intervention

Xiaoyan ZOU, Ruihong ZHANG. Evolutionary Game Study of the Cooperation Mode Between Renewable Energy Generation Enterprises and Energy Storage Companies Considering Government Intervention[J]. Electric Power, 2025, 58(1): 153-163.

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References 22

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博弈主体	参数	定义
政府部门	$F$	地方政府干预策略的总成本
	$F_1$	地方政府干预策略的可变成本
	$F_2$	地方政府干预策略的固定成本
	$s$	地方政府干预效率
	$R_1$	合作后地方政府获得的社会总效益
	$T_1$	给予发电企业的合作补贴
	$T_2$	给予储能公司的合作补贴
	$W$	上级政府对不作为地方政府的惩罚
可再生能源发电企业	$C_1$	发电企业众筹共建储能电站投资额
	$S_{ 1}$	发电企业配储电量收益
	$N$	众筹共建下储能电站外包风险
	$B$	众筹共建下储能电站外包费用
	$t$	投资商参与度
储能公司	$M_2$	众筹共建下储能电站运维成本
	$S_{ 2}$	众筹共建下储能电站现货市场收益
	$C_2$	容量租赁收益
	$C_4$	容量租赁下储能电站建设成本
	$M_1$	容量租赁下储能电站运维成本

博弈主体	参数	定义
政府部门	$F$	地方政府干预策略的总成本
	$F_1$	地方政府干预策略的可变成本
	$F_2$	地方政府干预策略的固定成本
	$s$	地方政府干预效率
	$R_1$	合作后地方政府获得的社会总效益
	$T_1$	给予发电企业的合作补贴
	$T_2$	给予储能公司的合作补贴
	$W$	上级政府对不作为地方政府的惩罚
可再生能源发电企业	$C_1$	发电企业众筹共建储能电站投资额
	$S_{ 1}$	发电企业配储电量收益
	$N$	众筹共建下储能电站外包风险
	$B$	众筹共建下储能电站外包费用
	$t$	投资商参与度
储能公司	$M_2$	众筹共建下储能电站运维成本
	$S_{ 2}$	众筹共建下储能电站现货市场收益
	$C_2$	容量租赁收益
	$C_4$	容量租赁下储能电站建设成本
	$M_1$	容量租赁下储能电站运维成本

策略组合（地方政府，发电企业，储能公司）		收益
(干预，众筹共建，众筹共建)		$\begin{aligned} &(s + t)R_1 - [(1 - t)F_1 + F_2]\text{；}\\&- C_1 + S_{ 1} - (1 - t)B - (1 - t)N\text{；}\\&B - M_2 + S_{ 2}\end{aligned}$
(干预，众筹共建，容量租赁)		$\begin{aligned} &(s + t)R_1 - [(1 - t)F_1 + F_2] - T_1 - T_2\text{；}\\ &- C_1 + S_{ 1} - (1 - t)B - (1 - t)N + T_1\text{；}\\&C_2 - C_4 - M_1 + T_2\end{aligned} $
(干预，容量租赁，众筹共建)		$\begin{aligned} &sR_1 - F_1 - F_2 - T_1 - T_2\text{；}\\ &- C_2 + S_{ 1} + T_1\text{；}\\&B - M_2 + S_{ 2} + T_2\end{aligned} $
(干预，容量租赁，容量租赁)		$\begin{aligned} &sR_1 - F_1 - F_2\text{；}\\& - C_2 + S_{ 1}\text{；}\\& C_2 - C_4 - M_1\end{aligned}$
(不干预，众筹共建，众筹共建)		$\begin{aligned} &(s + t)R_1 - W\text{；}\\& - C_1 + S_{ 1} - (1 - t)B - (1 - t)N\text{；}\\& B - M_2 + S_{ 2}\end{aligned}$
(不干预，众筹共建，容量租赁)		$\begin{aligned} &(s + t)R_1 - W\text{；}\\& - C_1 + S_{ 1} - (1 - t)B - (1 - t)N\text{；}\\&C_2 - C_4 - M_1\end{aligned}$
(不干预，容量租赁，众筹共建)		$\begin{aligned} &sR_1 - W\text{；}\\& - C_2 + S_{ 1}\text{；}\\ &B - M_2 + S_{ 2}\end{aligned}$
(不干预，容量租赁，容量租赁)		$\begin{aligned} &sR_1 - W\text{；}\\ &S_{ 1} - C_2\text{；}\\&C_2 - C_4 - M_1\end{aligned}$

策略组合（地方政府，发电企业，储能公司）		收益
(干预，众筹共建，众筹共建)		$\begin{aligned} &(s + t)R_1 - [(1 - t)F_1 + F_2]\text{；}\\&- C_1 + S_{ 1} - (1 - t)B - (1 - t)N\text{；}\\&B - M_2 + S_{ 2}\end{aligned}$
(干预，众筹共建，容量租赁)		$\begin{aligned} &(s + t)R_1 - [(1 - t)F_1 + F_2] - T_1 - T_2\text{；}\\ &- C_1 + S_{ 1} - (1 - t)B - (1 - t)N + T_1\text{；}\\&C_2 - C_4 - M_1 + T_2\end{aligned} $
(干预，容量租赁，众筹共建)		$\begin{aligned} &sR_1 - F_1 - F_2 - T_1 - T_2\text{；}\\ &- C_2 + S_{ 1} + T_1\text{；}\\&B - M_2 + S_{ 2} + T_2\end{aligned} $
(干预，容量租赁，容量租赁)		$\begin{aligned} &sR_1 - F_1 - F_2\text{；}\\& - C_2 + S_{ 1}\text{；}\\& C_2 - C_4 - M_1\end{aligned}$
(不干预，众筹共建，众筹共建)		$\begin{aligned} &(s + t)R_1 - W\text{；}\\& - C_1 + S_{ 1} - (1 - t)B - (1 - t)N\text{；}\\& B - M_2 + S_{ 2}\end{aligned}$
(不干预，众筹共建，容量租赁)		$\begin{aligned} &(s + t)R_1 - W\text{；}\\& - C_1 + S_{ 1} - (1 - t)B - (1 - t)N\text{；}\\&C_2 - C_4 - M_1\end{aligned}$
(不干预，容量租赁，众筹共建)		$\begin{aligned} &sR_1 - W\text{；}\\& - C_2 + S_{ 1}\text{；}\\ &B - M_2 + S_{ 2}\end{aligned}$
(不干预，容量租赁，容量租赁)		$\begin{aligned} &sR_1 - W\text{；}\\ &S_{ 1} - C_2\text{；}\\&C_2 - C_4 - M_1\end{aligned}$

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