大规模风电并网背景下火电调峰行为演化博弈模型

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201708144

中国电力 ›› 2018, Vol. 51 ›› Issue (9): 151-157.DOI: 10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201708144

大规模风电并网背景下火电调峰行为演化博弈模型

董福贵¹, 吴南南¹, 么峻¹, 李虎军², 白宏坤², 靳春旭¹

1. 华北电力大学经济与管理学院, 北京 102206;
2. 国网河南省电力公司经济技术研究院, 河南郑州 450052

收稿日期:2017-09-07 修回日期:2018-03-19 出版日期:2018-09-05 发布日期:2018-09-20
作者简介:董福贵(1974-),男,通信作者,博士,副教授,从事能源管理理论与方法、电力市场相关研究,E-mail:dfg@yeah.net;吴南南(1994-),女,硕士研究生,从事电力工业,工业经济相关研究,E-mail:1361314055@qq.com;么俊(1993-),女,硕士研究生,从事能源管理方法与理论,电力市场相关研究,E-mail:675711992@qq.com
基金资助:
教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目（15YJA630011）。

Study on Evolutionary Game Model of Thermal Power Regulation in Large-scale Wind Power Grid Integration

DONG Fugui¹, WU Nannan¹, YAO Jun¹, LI Hujun², BAI Hongkun², JIN Chunxu¹

1. School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China;
2. State Grid Henan Economic Research Institute, Zhengzhou 450052, China

Received:2017-09-07 Revised:2018-03-19 Online:2018-09-05 Published:2018-09-20
Supported by:
This work is supported by Social Science Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (No.15YJA630011).

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为解决大规模风电并网所带来的消纳问题，基于火电机组容量和最高调峰率指标，以公平性原则为前提，针对不同类别的机组，设定了有偿与无偿调峰划分标准。将火电调峰行为转化为上网电量竞价收益与调峰辅助服务收益演化博弈问题，讨论了综合考虑两个市场情景下，各类火电厂的竞价策略及对应策略下的收益，分别求解了稳定策略。针对两类电厂的博弈问题进行了实证分析。结果表明：现阶段的调峰辅助服务补偿额与上网电量收益额存在巨大差距，并且这一情况在今后一段时间内仍将存在。制订合理的辅助服务市场规则，提升火电机组调峰的积极性，从而促进大规模风电消纳是亟须解决的问题。

关键词: 风电并网, 风电消纳, 激励机制, 火电调峰, 演化博弈

Abstract: To solve the absorption problem caused by large-scale wind power grid connection, under condition of fairness, the criteria to determine paid and unpaid peak-shaving units is set up for different types of units based on the capacity of thermal power units and their maximum peak-rates. The peaking evolutionary behavior of thermal power units can be transformed into the evolutionary game between electricity bidding and peaking auxiliary service revenue. Under the context of two market scenarios, the bidding strategy and the corresponding revenue of all kinds of thermal power plants are discussed comprehensively, then corresponding stability strategy is solved respectively. The game problem of two kinds of power plants is analyzed empirically. It is shown that at the current stage there is a huge gap between the compensation amount of peak-shaving auxiliary service and the revenue of the on-grid electricity, which will exist for some time in the future. Therefore it is becoming urgent to establish reasonable auxiliary service market and promote the positiveness of peak regulations of thermal power units so as to improve the ability for absorbing large-scale wind power generation.

Key words: wind power integration, wind power consumption, incentive mechanism, thermal power peak regulation, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

TM715

董福贵, 吴南南, 么峻, 李虎军, 白宏坤, 靳春旭. 大规模风电并网背景下火电调峰行为演化博弈模型[J]. 中国电力, 2018, 51(9): 151-157.

DONG Fugui, WU Nannan, YAO Jun, LI Hujun, BAI Hongkun, JIN Chunxu. Study on Evolutionary Game Model of Thermal Power Regulation in Large-scale Wind Power Grid Integration[J]. Electric Power, 2018, 51(9): 151-157.

导出引用管理器 EndNote|Ris|BibTeX

链接本文: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/CN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201708144

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/CN/Y2018/V51/I9/151

参考文献

[1] 徐涛. 2017年全球风电装机统计[C]//风能产业. 北京:全球风能理事会, 2018:51-57.
[2] 蒋平, 杨绍进, 霍雨翀. 考虑风电场出力随机性的电网静态安全分析[J]. 电力系统自动化, 2013, 37(22):35-40 JIANG Ping, YANG Shaojin, HUO Yuchong. Static security analysis of power systems considering randomness of wind farm output[J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems, 2013, 37(22):35-40
[3] 李明, 胡殿刚, 周有学. 基于"两个替代"战略的甘肃新能源就地消纳模式研究与实践[J]. 电网技术, 2016, 40(10):2991-2997 LI Ming, HU Diangang, ZHOU Youxue. Research and practice of renewable energy local consumption mode in Gansu province based on "Double alternative" strategy[J]. Power System Technology, 2016, 40(10):2991-2997
[4] 牛东晓, 李建锋, 魏林君, 等. 跨区电网中风电消纳影响因素分析及综合评估方法研究[J]. 电网技术, 2016, 40(4):1087-1093 NIU Dongxiao, LI Jianfeng, WEI Linjun, et al. Study on technical factors analysis and overall evaluation method regarding wind power integration in trans-provincial power grid[J]. Power System Technology, 2016, 40(4):1087-1093
[5] 杨玉龙, 李军徽, 朱星旭. 基于储能系统提高风电外送能力的经济性研究[J]. 储能科学与技术, 2014, 3(1):47-52 YANG Yulong, LI Junhui, ZHU Xingxu. Economic assessment on the use of energy storage to improve clustered wind generation transmission[J]. Energy Storage Science and Technology, 2014, 3(1):47-52
[6] 吴雄, 王秀丽, 李骏, 等. 考虑风电外送的省级系统调峰分析模型[J]. 电网技术, 2013, 37(6):1578-1583 WU Xiong, WANG Xiuli, LI Jun, et al. A model to analyze peak load regulation of provincial power system considering sending-out of wind power[J]. Power System Technology, 2013, 37(6):1578-1583
[7] 林俐, 邹兰青, 周鹏, 等. 规模风电并网条件下火电机组深度调峰的多角度经济性分析[J]. 电力系统自动化, 2017, 41(7):21-27 LIN Li, ZOU Lanqing, ZHOU Peng, et al. Multi-angle economic analysis on deep peak regulation of thermal power units with large-scale wind power integration[J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems, 2017, 41(7):21-27
[8] 赵晓丽, 王玫, 赵越, 等. 基于火电机组容量差异的调峰辅助服务补偿机制改进模型[J]. 电力系统自动化, 2013, 37(4):57-61 ZHAO Xiaoli, WANG Mei, ZHAO Yue, et al. A model of compensation mechanism on peak-regulating ancillary services based on capacity variance across thermal power units[J]. Electric Power Systems, 2013, 37(4):57-61
[9] 胡军峰. 风电接入引致电网辅助服务成本分摊机制及模型研究[D]. 北京:华北电力大学, 2014.
[10] JU Liwei, LI Huanhuan, YU Xiaobo, et al. A combined external delivery optimization model for wind power and thermal power considering carbon trading and tradable green certificates based on Credibility theory[J]. International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2016, 78:51-60.
[11] 李亚龙, 刘文颖, 谢昶, 等. 高载能负荷消纳受阻风电的供应链博弈决策方法探究[J]. 电力系统自动化, 2017, 41(7):135-143 LI Yalong, LIU Wenying, XIE Chang, et al. Supply chains game based decision-making method of congested wind power consumption for high-energy load[J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems, 2017, 41(7):135-143
[12] 刘海波. 东北电网风电调峰辅助服务机制完善及交易优化模型研究[D]. 北京:华北电力大学, 2016.
[13] 张也. 大规模风电并网背景下火电调峰行为演化博弈模型研究[D]. 北京:华北电力大学, 2017.
[14] ALSKAIF T, ZAPATA M G, BELLALTA B. Game theory for energy efficiency in wireless sensor networks:lastest trends[J]. Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 2015, 54:33-61.
[15] 陆辰超, 邬冬华. 不确定性下非合作博弈的有限理性模型及良定性[J]. 应用数学与计算数学学报, 2016, 30(3):339-348 LU Chenchao, WU Donghua. Bounded rationality and well-posedness in non-cooperative games under uncertainty[J]. Communication on Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2016, 30(3):339-348
[16] 白宏坤, 周脉玉, 尹硕, 等. 基于大比例新能源输电的受端电网调峰费用测算及补偿机制[J]. 中国电力, 2016, 49(8):121-125 BAI Hongkun, ZHOU Maiyu, YIN Shuo, et al. Estimation of receiving-end grid power peaking cost and compensation mechanism based on large-proportion renewable energy transmission[J]. Electric Power, 2016, 49(8):121-125
[17] 李兴华, 何育东. 燃煤火电机组SO₂超低排放改造方案研究[J]. 中国电力, 2015, 48(10):148-151, 160 LI Xinghua, HE Yudong. Study on modification of ultra-low SO₂ emission in coal-fired power plants[J]. Electric Power, 2015, 48(10):148-151, 160
[18] 谢娟英, 鲁肖肖, 屈亚楠, 等. 粒计算优化初始聚类中心的K-medoids聚类算法[J]. 计算机科学与探索, 2015, 9(5):611-620 XIE Juanying, LU Xiaoxiao, QU Yanan, et al. K-medoids clustering algorithms with optimized initial seeds by granular computing[J]. Journal of Frontiers of Computer Science and Technology, 2015, 9(5):611-620
[19] 赵令锐, 张骥骧. 碳排放权交易中企业减排行为的演化博弈分析[J]. 科技管理研究, 2016, 36(5):215-221 ZHAO Lingrui, ZHANG Jixiang. Evolutionary game analysis of abatement behaviors of firms participating in carbon emission trading[J]. Science and Technology Management Research, 2016, 36(5):215-221
[20] 刘一欣, 郭力, 王成山. 多微电网参与下的配电侧电力市场竞价博弈方法[J]. 电网技术, 2017, 41(8):2469-2476 LIU Yixin, GUO Li, WANG Chengshan. Optimal bidding strategy for microgrids in electricity distribution market[J]. Power System Technology, 2017, 41(8):2469-2476
[21] 顾顺超. 基于演化博弈论的发电商竞价行为的研究[D]. 北京:华北电力大学, 2011.

大规模风电并网背景下火电调峰行为演化博弈模型

Study on Evolutionary Game Model of Thermal Power Regulation in Large-scale Wind Power Grid Integration

RichHTML

PDF (PC)

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

编辑推荐

Metrics

[1]	邹小燕, 张瑞宏. 考虑政府干预的可再生能源与储能企业合作模式演化博弈研究[J]. 中国电力, 2025, 58(1): 153-163.
[2]	周专, 苗帅, 袁铁江. 提升风电消纳的绿氢钢铁冶炼系统动力学建模[J]. 中国电力, 2024, 57(8): 36-45.
[3]	高月芬, 员成博, 孔凡鹏, 王雪松. 需求响应激励下耦合电转气、碳捕集设备的综合能源系统优化[J]. 中国电力, 2024, 57(4): 32-41.
[4]	刘宁, 张驰, 王栋, 杨明杰. 西北地区扶贫光伏整县开发决策演化博弈[J]. 中国电力, 2024, 57(2): 149-160.
[5]	王海燕, 钱林宇. 基于NGO-VMD的混合储能功率分配策略[J]. 中国电力, 2024, 57(11): 119-128.
[6]	晁文浩, 袁至, 李骥. 计及电转气-风-火-核-碳捕集的多源联合系统优化调度[J]. 中国电力, 2024, 57(1): 183-194.
[7]	陈曦, 陈万露, 田洪莉, 林健怡, 江天炎, 毕茂强. 售电公司串谋定价行为随机演化博弈分析[J]. 中国电力, 2023, 56(9): 27-34,133.
[8]	王楠, 张辰, 何旭道, 杨雨薇, 陈炼, 刘浩, 王晨晨, 姜旭东, 叶成. 基于弃风消纳的热网主动储热优化[J]. 中国电力, 2023, 56(2): 114-122.
[9]	黄畅, 颜逸贤, 白尧, 张琪, 王卫良, 李文娜. 促进风电消纳的太阳能-燃煤热电联产系统性能研究[J]. 中国电力, 2022, 55(5): 182-188.
[10]	石庆松, 秦蕊, 肖鹏, 欧阳丽炜, 熊刚, 张宏鑫, 王飞跃. 基于联盟链的电力物资采购数据共享激励机制[J]. 中国电力, 2022, 55(3): 87-96.
[11]	杨昆, 孙磊, 房超运, 张怡. 促进新能源消纳的混合发电系统[J]. 中国电力, 2022, 55(2): 145-151.
[12]	刘新元, 程雪婷, 薄利明, 张家瑞, 郑惠萍, 郝捷. 考虑源荷协调的含储热光热电站和风电系统的日前-日内调度策略[J]. 中国电力, 2021, 54(8): 144-153.
[13]	郄朝辉, 李兆伟, 王维洲, 李威, 柯贤波. 直流闭锁故障下风电并网功率和直流输送功率的耦合关系分析[J]. 中国电力, 2021, 54(6): 175-182.
[14]	杨蕾, 王智超, 周鑫, 李胜男, 和鹏, 向川, 张杰, 王德林. 大规模双馈风电机组并网频率稳定控制策略[J]. 中国电力, 2021, 54(5): 186-194.
[15]	周任军, 邓子昂, 徐健, 朱疆生, 王仰之. 碳捕集燃气热电机组碳循环及其虚拟电厂优化运行[J]. 中国电力, 2020, 53(9): 166-171.

模态框（Modal）标题

大规模风电并网背景下火电调峰行为演化博弈模型

Study on Evolutionary Game Model of Thermal Power Regulation in Large-scale Wind Power Grid Integration

RichHTML

PDF (PC)

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

编辑推荐

Metrics