考虑消纳责任权重的可再生能源电力供应链绿证监管演化博弈分析

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202410060

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

绿证是解决光伏、风电等可再生能源电力消纳问题的重要举措，然而，绿证申报主体可能存在“欺骗”行为。联合消纳责任权重和绿证，研究可再生能源电力供应链各方关于绿证申报和政府监管的演化博弈问题。首先，从短期视角，研究发电企业和电网公司组成的二级可再生能源电力供应链的消纳问题。然后，在此基础上，从长期视角构建发电企业-电网公司-国家能源局三方演化博弈模型，分析三方策略的动态演化过程及其演化稳定策略。最后，通过仿真分析验证研究结论。结果表明，提高惩罚系数会促进发电企业和电网公司选择“诚实”策略，降低绿证收益返还系数可以激励电网公司选择“诚实”策略，相对较高的溢出效益和相对较低的严格监管成本有助于形成健康的绿证市场运营机制。

关键词: 三方演化博弈, 可再生能源电力消纳, 绿证, 消纳责任权重, 监管

Abstract:

Green certificate is an important measure to solve the consumption problem of the renewable energies such as photovoltaic and wind power. However, the applicants of green certificate may engage in "cheating" behaviors. This paper explores the evolutionary game for green certificate application and government regulation of all parties in the renewable energy power supply chain by combining the renewable portfolio standard and green certificate. Firstly, from the short-term perspective, a study is made on the renewable energy consumption problem of the renewable energy power supply chain composed of power generation enterprises and power grid companies. And then, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed among the power generation enterprise, power grid company and the National Energy Administration from a long-term perspective, and the dynamic evolution process and the evolutionary stability strategy of the tripartite strategies are analyzed. Finally, the research conclusions are verified through simulation analysis. The results show that increasing the penalty coefficient will impel power generation enterprise and power grid company to choose "honesty" strategy, and reducing the return coefficient of green certificate income can encourage power grid company to choose "honesty" strategy; relatively high spillover benefits and relatively low strict regulatory costs are conducive to the formation of a healthy green certificate market operation mechanism.

Key words: tripartite evolutionary game, renewable electricity consumption, green certificate, renewable portfolio standard, supervision

戴道明, 赵莺. 考虑消纳责任权重的可再生能源电力供应链绿证监管演化博弈分析[J]. 中国电力, 2025, 58(4): 216-229.

DAI Daoming, ZHAO Ying. Evolutionary Game Analysis for Government Supervision of Green Electricity Certificate in a Renewable Energy Power Supply Chain with Portfolio Standard[J]. Electric Power, 2025, 58(4): 216-229.

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链接本文: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/CN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202410060

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/CN/Y2025/V58/I4/216

图/表 13

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发电企业	电网公司	国家能源局
发电企业	电网公司	严格监管$ z $	宽松监管$ (1 - z) $
诚实 x	诚实 y	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}}, - {D_{\text{s}}} + L) $	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}},0) $
诚实 x	欺骗 (1–y)	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}} - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}}, - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}}) $	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}} + R_{\text{1}}^{\text{d}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}} + R_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}}, - {D_{\text{b}}}) $
欺骗 (1–x)	诚实 y	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}} - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}}, - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}}) $	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}} + R_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}} + R_{\text{2}}^{\text{f}}, - {D_{\text{b}}}) $
欺骗 (1–x)	欺骗 (1–y)	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}} - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}} - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}}, - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} + F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}}) $	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}} + R_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}} + R_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}}, - {D_{\text{b}}}) $

发电企业	电网公司	国家能源局
发电企业	电网公司	严格监管$ z $	宽松监管$ (1 - z) $
诚实 x	诚实 y	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}}, - {D_{\text{s}}} + L) $	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}},0) $
诚实 x	欺骗 (1–y)	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}} - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}}, - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}}) $	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}} + R_{\text{1}}^{\text{d}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}} + R_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}}, - {D_{\text{b}}}) $
欺骗 (1–x)	诚实 y	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}} - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}}, - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}}) $	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}} + R_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}} + R_{\text{2}}^{\text{f}}, - {D_{\text{b}}}) $
欺骗 (1–x)	欺骗 (1–y)	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}} - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}} - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}}, - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} + F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}}) $	$ (R_{\text{1}}^{{}} + R_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}},R_{\text{2}}^{{}} + R_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}}, - {D_{\text{b}}}) $

均衡点	特征值$ {\lambda _1} $、$ {\lambda _2} $、$ {\lambda _3} $	符号	稳定性结论	条件
$ {E_1}(0,0,0) $	$ - R_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} + R_{\text{1}}^{\text{d}} $，$ R_{\text{2}}^{\text{f}} - R_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} $，$ {D_{\text{b}}} - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} + F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} $	$ - , - , - $	ESS	①
$ {E_2}(0,0,1) $	$ F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} $，$ F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} $，$ - {D_{\text{b}}} + {D_{\text{s}}} - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} $	$ + , + , + $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_3}(0,1,0) $	$ - R_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $，$ R_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} - R_{\text{2}}^{\text{f}} $，$ {D_{\text{b}}} - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $	$ - , + , - $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_4}(0,1,1) $	$ F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $，$ - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} $，$ - {D_{\text{b}}} + {D_{\text{s}}} - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $	$ + , - , + $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_5}(1,0,0) $	$ R_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} - R_{\text{1}}^{\text{d}} $，$ - R_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $，$ {D_{\text{b}}} - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $	$ + , - , - $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_6}(1,0,1) $	$ - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} $，$ F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $，$ - {D_{\text{b}}} + {D_{\text{s}}} - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $	$ - , + , + $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_7}(1,1,0) $	$ R_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $，$ R_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $，$ L - {D_{\text{s}}} $	$ + , + , + $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_8}(1,1,1) $	$ - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $，$ - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $，$ - L + {D_{\text{s}}} $	$ - , - , - $	ESS	②

均衡点	特征值$ {\lambda _1} $、$ {\lambda _2} $、$ {\lambda _3} $	符号	稳定性结论	条件
$ {E_1}(0,0,0) $	$ - R_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} + R_{\text{1}}^{\text{d}} $，$ R_{\text{2}}^{\text{f}} - R_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} $，$ {D_{\text{b}}} - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} + F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} $	$ - , - , - $	ESS	①
$ {E_2}(0,0,1) $	$ F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} $，$ F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} $，$ - {D_{\text{b}}} + {D_{\text{s}}} - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} $	$ + , + , + $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_3}(0,1,0) $	$ - R_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $，$ R_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} - R_{\text{2}}^{\text{f}} $，$ {D_{\text{b}}} - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $	$ - , + , - $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_4}(0,1,1) $	$ F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $，$ - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{t}} $，$ - {D_{\text{b}}} + {D_{\text{s}}} - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $	$ + , - , + $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_5}(1,0,0) $	$ R_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} - R_{\text{1}}^{\text{d}} $，$ - R_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $，$ {D_{\text{b}}} - {D_{\text{s}}} + F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $	$ + , - , - $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_6}(1,0,1) $	$ - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{t}} $，$ F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $，$ - {D_{\text{b}}} + {D_{\text{s}}} - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $	$ - , + , + $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_7}(1,1,0) $	$ R_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $，$ R_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $，$ L - {D_{\text{s}}} $	$ + , + , + $	不稳定点	\
$ {E_8}(1,1,1) $	$ - F_{\text{1}}^{\text{f}} $，$ - F_{\text{2}}^{\text{d}} $，$ - L + {D_{\text{s}}} $	$ - , - , - $	ESS	②

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