发电商策略性竞价对省间-省内现货市场影响与应对策略

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202503108

中国电力 ›› 2025, Vol. 58 ›› Issue (11): 1-13.DOI: 10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202503108

• 推进全国统一电力市场建设关键技术与机制 • 上一篇下一篇

发电商策略性竞价对省间-省内现货市场影响与应对策略

尚静怡¹(), 张艺涵¹(), 杨福旺²(), 向明旭²()

1. 国网河南省电力公司经济技术研究院，河南郑州　450052
2. 输变电装备技术全国重点实验室（重庆大学），重庆　400044

收稿日期:2025-03-28 修回日期:2025-07-11 发布日期:2025-12-01 出版日期:2025-11-28
作者简介:
尚静怡（1996），女，博士，从事竞争性电力市场研究，E-mail：jyshang@qq.com
张艺涵（1993），女，硕士，工程师，从事竞争性电力市场研究，E-mail：zhangyihan0310@163.com
杨福旺（2001），男，硕士研究生，从事电力市场及优化调度研究，E-mail：20202770@stu.cqu.edu.cn
向明旭（1994），男，通信作者，博士，助理研究员，从事电力系统运行优化及电力市场研究，E-mail：mxxiang@cqu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（52307082）。

Impacts and Countermeasures of Generators' Strategic Bidding on Inter-Provincial and Intra-Provincial Spot Markets

SHANG Jingyi¹(), ZHANG Yihan¹(), YANG Fuwang²(), XIANG Mingxu²()

1. State Grid Henan Electric Power Company Economic and Technical Research Institute, Zhengzhou 450052, China
2. State Key Laboratory of Power Transmission Equipment Technology (Chongqing University), Chongqing 400044, China

Received:2025-03-28 Revised:2025-07-11 Online:2025-12-01 Published:2025-11-28
Supported by:
This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.52307082).

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

电力现货市场价格是反映市场供需关系、引导资源优化配置的重要信号。但在市场资源稀缺时，部分发电商存在滥用市场力以谋求更大收益的动机，从而导致市场价格信号失灵、用户侧过度支付等后果。建立合理的市场力监管防控机制、引导市场主体充分竞争是解决该问题的关键。为此，根据国内两级电力市场运作的实际情况，首先建立发电商参与两级现货市场的竞争均衡模型；然后，基于资源稀缺时发电商策略性行为的相关性，对发电商策略性竞价行为进行扫描，分析发电商的策略性竞价空间，量化市场力滥用的影响，并对极端保供场景下当前市场机制存在的问题进行模拟分析；最后，基于算例分析结果，对发电商策略性行为机理进行了剖析，提出从优化市场申报机制、完善市场监管与惩罚体系、建立双边竞价引导的市场竞争均衡三方面完善两级现货市场交易机制。

关键词: 电力现货市场, 省间市场交易, 策略性竞价, 价格信号, 激励相容

Abstract:

Electricity spot-market price serve as a crucial signal that reflects supply-demand dynamics and guides optimal allocation of resources. However, when market resources become scarce, some generators may exploit their market power to secure higher profits, resulting in distorted market price signals and excessive costs for end users. Establishing a robust mechanism for monitoring and constraining market power, and fostering vigorous competition among market participants, is therefore essential. Accordingly, based on the operational realities of the two-tier electricity market in China, a competitive equilibrium model is first established to represent generators' participation in the two-level spot markets. Next, based on the correlation of generators' strategic behaviors during resource scarcity, their strategic bidding practices are scanned, the scope of their bidding strategies is analyzed, the impacts of market-power abuse are quantified, and a simulation analysis is conducted on the problems existing in the current market mechanism under extreme supply-security scenarios. Finally, based on the case study results, the mechanisms of generators' strategic behavior is analyzed, and recommendations are proposed to improve the two-tier spot market trading mechanism from three aspects: optimizing the market bidding mechanism, enhancing the market supervision and penalty system, and establishing a bilateral bidding-guided market competition equilibrium.

Key words: electricity spot market, inter-provincial market trading, strategic bidding, price signal, incentive compatibility

尚静怡, 张艺涵, 杨福旺, 向明旭. 发电商策略性竞价对省间-省内现货市场影响与应对策略[J]. 中国电力, 2025, 58(11): 1-13.

SHANG Jingyi, ZHANG Yihan, YANG Fuwang, XIANG Mingxu. Impacts and Countermeasures of Generators' Strategic Bidding on Inter-Provincial and Intra-Provincial Spot Markets[J]. Electric Power, 2025, 58(11): 1-13.

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链接本文: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/CN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202503108

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/CN/Y2025/V58/I11/1

图/表 11

图 1 策略型竞价下考虑I个发电商的电力市场EPEC模型

Fig.1 EPEC model of electricity market considering I generator under strategic bidding

表 1 参数设置

Table 1 Parameter setting

项目	省份
项目	A	B	C	D
真实成本范围/ (元·(kW·h)^–1)	0.222~ 0.373	0.210~ 0.417	0.233~ 0.364	0.242~ 0.388
总装机容量/MW	23450	23450	16750	15075

图 2 A省发电商不同竞价策略下总收益

Fig.2 Total revenue of generators in province A under different bidding strategies

图 3 A省发电商不同竞价策略下C省的购电费用

Fig.3 Electricity purchase costs in province C under different bidding strategies by generators in province A

图 4 E省发电商不同竞价策略下总收益

Fig.4 Total revenue of generators in province E under different bidding strategies

图 5 发电商不同竞价策略下的省间市场出清价格

Fig.5 Inter-provincial market clearing prices under different bidding strategies of generators

图 6 E省发电商不同竞价策略下市场出清价格

Fig.6 Market clearing prices under different bidding strategies of generators in province E

图 7 极端场景下E省发电商不同竞价策略下的收益

Fig.7 Revenues of generators in province E under different bidding strategies in extreme scenarios

表 2 不同竞价策略下售电省份发电商收益对比

Table 2 Comparison of revenues of generators in electricity-selling provinces under different bidding strategies

省份	市场	收益/万元		增长幅度/%
省份	市场	真实报价	最优策略	增长幅度/%
E	省内	683.05	2121.97	310.66
	省间	227.70	1762.31	773.96
	省内+省间	910.75	3884.28	426.79
F	省内	1404.17	1404.17	0
	省间	62.50	5832.17	933.14
	省内+省间	1466.67	7236.34	493.39

表 3 不同竞价策略下购电省份的省间支付对比

Table 3 Comparison of inter-provincial payments in electricity-purchasing provinces under different bidding strategies

省份	省间购电费用/万元		增长幅度/%
省份	真实报价	最优策略	增长幅度/%
G	251.00	2256.52	899.01
H	329.00	2957.74	899.01
I	407.00	3658.96	898.95

图 8 一次申报模式示意

Fig.8 Schematic diagram of the one-time bidding model

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发电商策略性竞价对省间-省内现货市场影响与应对策略

Impacts and Countermeasures of Generators' Strategic Bidding on Inter-Provincial and Intra-Provincial Spot Markets

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发电商策略性竞价对省间-省内现货市场影响与应对策略

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