中国电力 ›› 2023, Vol. 56 ›› Issue (1): 49-55.DOI: 10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202204071

• 电价市场化改革与价格监管 • 上一篇    下一篇

激励相容的分段式用户互动补偿电价合同模型

郁清云1, 束云豪1, 戴小妹2   

  1. 1. 国网江苏省电力有限公司常州供电分公司,江苏 常州 213004;
    2. 国网江苏省电力有限公司超高压分公司,江苏 南京 211100
  • 收稿日期:2022-04-18 修回日期:2022-11-03 出版日期:2023-01-28 发布日期:2023-01-14
  • 作者简介:郁清云(1995-),女,硕士,助理工程师,从事电力市场与电力经济研究,E-mail:2899635283@qq.com;束云豪(1994-),男,硕士,助理工程师,从事电力系统运行维护工作,E-mail:34236339@qq.com;戴小妹(1995-),女,硕士,助理工程师,从事可再生能源发电系统建模研究,E-mail:daixmwork@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    江苏省重点研发计划资助项目(BE2020688)

Incentive Compatible Interactive Compensation Electricity Price Contract Model for Segmented Users

YU Qingyun1, SHU Yunhao1, DAI Xiaomei2   

  1. 1. State Grid Changzhou Power Supply Company, Changzhou 213004, China;
    2. State Grid Jiangsu EHV Company, Nanjing 211100, China
  • Received:2022-04-18 Revised:2022-11-03 Online:2023-01-28 Published:2023-01-14
  • Supported by:
    This work is supported by Key Research and Development Program of Jiangsu Province (No.BE2020688).

摘要: 实现电力用户与电网公司的友好互动是解决当前能源供需矛盾的有效方式,为了激励用户参与用电互动,需要设计合理的互动机制。提出一种适用于不同类型用户的激励相容的互动补偿电价合同模型。该模型以非线性定价为理论基础,以电网公司利益最大化为决策目标,考虑用户激励相容约束,确定不同类型用户对应的最优互动量和补偿价格。算例表明:该定价模型兼具定价效率与可操作性,不仅能够保证电网公司利益最大化,还能很好地激励用户参与互动,同时能够引导用户披露真实的类型信息,满足用户激励相容特性,在电力市场环境下具有现实的社会、经济意义。

关键词: 电价补偿, 互动机制, 非线性定价, 激励相容, 合同选项

Abstract: The friendly interaction between electricity users and power grid companies is an effective way to solve the current contradiction between energy supply and demand. In order to encourage electricity users to participate in power interactions, it is necessary to design a reasonable interaction mechanism. An incentive compatible interactive compensation price contract model is thus proposed for different types of users. Based on nonlinear pricing theory, the model takes the maximization of the interests of power grid companies as the decision-making goal, and considers the incentive compatible constraints of electricity users to determine the optimal interaction volume and compensation price corresponding to different types of users. Case study shows that the proposed pricing model has both pricing efficiency and operability. It can not only ensure the maximization of the interests of power grid companies, but also well encourage users to participate in power interactions. At the same time, it can guide users to disclose real type information, thus meeting the incentive compatibility characteristics of the users. It has both practical social and economic significance in the context of power market.

Key words: electricity price compensation, interaction mechanism, nonlinear pricing, incentive compatibility, contract options