中国电力 ›› 2024, Vol. 57 ›› Issue (4): 182-189.DOI: 10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202306011

• 电网 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑阻塞分摊和分配公平的微网群竞争交易机制

时珊珊1(), 冯然2, 方陈1, 刘舒1, 邓莉荣2(), 王皓靖1, 陈浦2   

  1. 1. 国网上海市电力公司电力科学研究院,上海 200437
    2. 上海电力大学 电气工程学院,上海 200090
  • 收稿日期:2023-06-05 出版日期:2024-04-28 发布日期:2024-04-26
  • 作者简介:时珊珊(1985—),女,从事微电网技术研究,E-mail:sss3397@163.com
    邓莉荣(1993—),女,通信作者,讲师,从事电力市场、综合能源系统研究,E-mail: denglr@shiep.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家电网有限公司科技项目(520940220006);国家自然科学基金资助项目(U2066214)。

A Competitive Trading Mechanism for Microgrid Group Considering Congestion Cost Allocation and Fair Distribution

Shanshan SHI1(), Ran FENG2, Chen FANG1, Shu LIU1, Lirong DENG2(), Haojing WANG1, Pu CHEN2   

  1. 1. State Grid Shanghai Electric Power Research Institute, Shanghai 200122, China
    2. College of Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Electric Power University, Shanghai 200090, China
  • Received:2023-06-05 Online:2024-04-28 Published:2024-04-26
  • Supported by:
    This work is supported by Science and Technology Project of SGCC (No.520940220006) and the Joint Funds of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.U2066214).

摘要:

节点边际电价机制难以保证微网真实报价,可能导致市场效率损失。同时考虑到输电线路阻塞情况频发,提出一种考虑阻塞分摊和分配公平的微网群竞争交易机制。首先,基于Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)理论,提出一种促进微网真实报价的支付模型;其次,由于VCG类机制的固有问题是收支不平衡,且系统存在阻塞加剧了这一不平衡情况,提出一种基于责任分摊法的系统收支不平衡量处理方法,按照微网对阻塞的影响程度将阻塞成本分摊,并将除去阻塞成本的剩余系统收支不平衡量均摊给消费型微网;最后,仿真结果充分验证了所提机制的有效性。

关键词: 价值公平分配, 激励相容, 阻塞成本

Abstract:

As the locational marginal pricing mechanism is hard to guarantee the real bidding of productive microgrids, the market efficiency may be decreased as a result. Considering the frequent occurence of transmission line conges-tion, this paper proposes a competitive trading mechanism for microgrid group considering congestion cost allo-cation and fair distribution. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) theory, a payment model that promotes the real bidding of microgrids is proposed. Since the inherent problem of the VCG mechanism is the budget im-balance, and the existence of congestion in the system worsens this imbalance, this paper proposes a method to deal with the system budget imbalance based on the responsibility sharing method, in which the congestion cost is shared according to the impact of microgrid on the congestion, and the remaining system budget imbalance excluding the congestion cost is shared among consumption-oriented microgrids. The simulation results have ful-ly verified the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.

Key words: fair benefit distribution, incentive compatibility, congestion cost