碳约束下基于双重博弈的电力零售商售电价格决策优化

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202309065

中国电力 ›› 2024, Vol. 57 ›› Issue (5): 126-136.DOI: 10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202309065

• 新型能源体系下电碳协同市场机制及优化运行 • 上一篇下一篇

碳约束下基于双重博弈的电力零售商售电价格决策优化

李方姝(), 余昆(), 陈星莺(), 华昊辰()

河海大学能源与电气学院，江苏南京　210098

收稿日期:2023-09-14 接受日期:2023-12-14 出版日期:2024-05-28 发布日期:2024-05-16
作者简介:李方姝（1999—），女，硕士研究生，从事电力市场与经济研究，E-mail：211606010132@hhu.edu.cn
余昆（1978—），男，博士，教授，从事智能配电网自愈控制与优化调度、用能系统高效运行与能源经济、用能互联网研究，E-mail：kunyu@hhu.edu.cn
陈星莺（1964—），女，博士，教授，从事配用电系统与电力市场、能源管控与能源经济研究，E-mail：xychen@hhu.edu.cn
华昊辰（1988—），男，通信作者，博士，教授，从事需求侧灵活资源调度、微网建模与控制、电力市场与电力经济研究，E-mail：huahc16@tsinghua.org.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（与电网友好互动的大规模楼宇群综合能源系统协同优化运行，U22B20112）。

Price Decision Optimization for Electricity Retailers Based on Dual Game under Carbon Constraints

Fangshu LI(), Kun YU(), Xingying CHEN(), Haochen HUA()

College of Energy and Electrical Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China

Received:2023-09-14 Accepted:2023-12-14 Online:2024-05-28 Published:2024-05-16
Supported by:
This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Coordinated Optimal Operation of Integrated Energy System for Large-Scale Building Clusters Considering Friendly Interaction with Power Grid, No.U22B20112).

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在碳约束下，市场中的多零售商竞争售电和多用户购电给电力零售商制定售电价格提高自身利润带来了挑战。为解决零售商售电价格制定的问题，提出了在碳约束条件下多电力零售商竞争售电和多用户购电的双重博弈价格决策优化模型。首先，建立各市场参与者的决策模型。其次，建立并描述电力零售商的双重博弈架构，其中，各电力零售商间构成非合作博弈，各零售商与各用户间构成主从博弈。然后，采用循环迭代嵌套IPOPT求解器的方法求解零售商的双重博弈问题。最后，通过仿真算例对所提模型进行验证分析。仿真结果表明，通过所提模型寻优合理的售电价格可以实现各零售商自身售电利润的最大化，同时用户也能通过博弈模型得到最优的购电策略，以提升用电综合满意度。

关键词: 电力零售商, 双重博弈, 碳约束, 价格决策, 需求响应

Abstract:

Under carbon constraints, multiple retailers competing for sale of electricity and multiple users purchasing electricity in the market bring challenges to electricity retailers in setting their selling price to increase their own profits. Thereby, a dual game price decision optimization model for multiple electricity retailers competing for sale of electricity and multiple users purchasing electricity is proposed to address the issue of retail electricity pricing under carbon constraints. Firstly, a decision-making model for each market participant is established. Secondly, a dual game framework is established for electricity retailers, in which non-cooperative games are formed among electricity retailers, and master-slave games are formed between retailers and users. And then, the loop nested solver IPOPT is used to solve the dual game problem of retailers. Finally, the proposed model is validated and analyzed through simulation examples. The simulation shows that the retailers can realize their profit maximization through the proposed model to optimize reasonable electricity selling price, and at the same time the users can obtain the optimal electricity purchase strategy through the game model to improve their comprehensive satisfaction of electricity consumption.

Key words: electricity retailers, dual game, carbon constraints, price decision, demand response

李方姝, 余昆, 陈星莺, 华昊辰. 碳约束下基于双重博弈的电力零售商售电价格决策优化[J]. 中国电力, 2024, 57(5): 126-136.

Fangshu LI, Kun YU, Xingying CHEN, Haochen HUA. Price Decision Optimization for Electricity Retailers Based on Dual Game under Carbon Constraints[J]. Electric Power, 2024, 57(5): 126-136.

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链接本文: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/CN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202309065

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/CN/Y2024/V57/I5/126

图/表 13

参考文献 29

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用户	$ {\alpha _m} $	$ {\beta _m} $
1	0.0005	0.15
2	0.0015	0.16
3	0.0010	0.15
4	0.0013	0.12

用户	$ {\alpha _m} $	$ {\beta _m} $
1	0.0005	0.15
2	0.0015	0.16
3	0.0010	0.15
4	0.0013	0.12

零售商		数值
火电零售商1 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},1}} $/(MW·h)		1400
火电零售商2 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},2}} $/(MW·h)		1350
火电零售商3 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},3}} $/(MW·h)		1240
火电零售商4 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},4}} $/(MW·h)		1110
绿电零售商1 $ {\bar q _{{\rm f},1}} $/(MW·h)		1250
绿电零售商2 $ {\bar q _{{\rm f},2}} $/(MW·h)		1280

零售商		数值
火电零售商1 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},1}} $/(MW·h)		1400
火电零售商2 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},2}} $/(MW·h)		1350
火电零售商3 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},3}} $/(MW·h)		1240
火电零售商4 $ {\bar q _{{\rm g},4}} $/(MW·h)		1110
绿电零售商1 $ {\bar q _{{\rm f},1}} $/(MW·h)		1250
绿电零售商2 $ {\bar q _{{\rm f},2}} $/(MW·h)		1280

参数		数值
火电零售商购火电的价格 $ {p_{\rm g}} $/(元·(MW·h)^–1)		37
绿电零售商购绿电的价格 $ {p_{\rm f}} $/(元·(MW·h)^–1)		45
碳排放权价格 $ {p_{\rm c}} $/(元·t^–1)		40
碳配额比例 $ \lambda $		0.4
电力零售商价格调整步长 $ \eta $		0.01

碳约束下基于双重博弈的电力零售商售电价格决策优化

Price Decision Optimization for Electricity Retailers Based on Dual Game under Carbon Constraints

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Metrics

零售商	时段	售电价格/(元·(MW·h)^–1)
零售商	时段	用户1	用户2	用户3	用户4
火电零售商1	谷	25.634	24.446	25.439	22.891
	平	55.210	59.132	56.486	55.519
	峰	114.313	110.709	109.301	117.410
火电零售商2	谷	23.916	23.736	22.573	20.027
	平	54.914	56.818	57.213	56.165
	峰	115.800	110.436	112.548	116.043
火电零售商3	谷	24.786	25.327	22.024	23.623
	平	55.148	52.726	52.759	55.312
	峰	117.235	115.564	110.964	112.495
火电零售商4	谷	27.113	25.453	24.123	24.692
	平	50.525	54.947	52.910	55.310
	峰	118.347	116.419	118.418	118.410
绿电零售商1	谷	54.136	55.684	55.626	54.129
	平	101.305	100.417	96.340	99.193
	峰	148.423	153.039	150.215	149.945
绿电零售商2	谷	55.197	52.419	53.745	54.402
	平	97.037	96.510	100.419	101.329
	峰	148.019	150.645	153.567	151.043

用户	需求响应前	需求响应后
1	167031	162162
2	159953	155399
3	163533	158881
4	165517	160697

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模态框（Modal）标题

碳约束下基于双重博弈的电力零售商售电价格决策优化

Price Decision Optimization for Electricity Retailers Based on Dual Game under Carbon Constraints

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