A Moving Target Defense Strategy against Load Redistribution Attacks

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202401005

Abstract

Abstract:

The load redistribution attack considers the actual equipment configuration and operation of the power system, and poses a threat to the safe and stable operation of the power system by tampering with load measurements. This paper proposes a moving target defense method based on topology control, which destroys the attacker's grasp of the power system information through transforming the system topology, thereby achieving the defense against load redistribution attacks and providing guarantees for the safe and reliable operation of the power system. Firstly, a bi-layer optimization model of load redistribution is established to analyze the attack strategy. Secondly, the optimization reconstruction mode of topology structure is analyzed to establish a network topology optimization model. Finally, the network topology optimization algorithm is combined with the state estimation to achieve moving target defense and testing of load redistribution attacks. The proposed method was tested in an IEEE 14 bus system, and it was proved that the proposed moving target defense method based on topological transformation can effectively defend load redistribution attacks and enhance the attack resistance of the power system.

Key words: state estimation, load redistribution attack, topological transformation, mixed integer linear programming, moving target defense

Quanpeng HE, Wei LIU, Weiyong YANG, Xingshen WEI, Qi WANG. A Moving Target Defense Strategy against Load Redistribution Attacks[J]. Electric Power, 2024, 57(9): 44-52.

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URL: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202401005

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/Y2024/V57/I9/44

Figures/Tables 9

References 21

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项目	发电机编号
项目	1	2	3	4	5
所在节点	1	2	3	6	8
成本系数/(美元·h^–1)	20	30	40	50	35
功率上限(p.u.)	3	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.2
功率下限(p.u.)	0	0	0	0	0

项目	发电机编号
项目	1	2	3	4	5
所在节点	1	2	3	6	8
成本系数/(美元·h^–1)	20	30	40	50	35
功率上限(p.u.)	3	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.2
功率下限(p.u.)	0	0	0	0	0

状态	发电机功率(p.u.)					切负荷量(p.u.)	运行成本/ (美元·h^–1)
状态	1	2	3	4	5	切负荷量(p.u.)	运行成本/ (美元·h^–1)
攻击前	2.0720	0	0	0	0	0	4144.0
攻击后	1.7592	0	0.3	0	0	0.0128	4846.4

状态	发电机功率(p.u.)					切负荷量(p.u.)	运行成本/ (美元·h^–1)
状态	1	2	3	4	5	切负荷量(p.u.)	运行成本/ (美元·h^–1)
攻击前	2.0720	0	0	0	0	0	4144.0
攻击后	1.7592	0	0.3	0	0	0.0128	4846.4

节点编号	2_0	2_1	3	4	5	6	7
原始注入	–0.1533		–0.7497	–0.3805	–0.0652	–0.0824	–0.0267
攻击注入	–0.2401		–0.8137	–0.1893	–0.0956	–0.0856	–0.0267
防御注入	–0.2754	–0.0015	–1.1362	–0.1879	–0.0743	–0.0835	0.0204

节点编号	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
原始注入	–0.0019	–0.2317	–0.0777	–0.0429	–0.0423	–0.1196	–0.1227
攻击注入	–0.0019	–0.1137	–0.0417	–0.0289	–0.0179	–0.0656	–0.0631
防御注入	–0.0076	–0.1101	–0.0505	–0.0122	–0.0306	–0.0553	–0.0529