International Practice of Generation Capacity Adequacy Guarantee Mechanism and Its Implications for China’s Electricity Market

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202205004

Abstract

Abstract: The green transformation of electrical energy and acceleration of spot market make it increasingly urgent to establish a guarantee mechanism of generation capacity adequacy and its path selection in China. Therefore, this paper reviewed the international practices of capacity adequacy guarantee mechanism, comprehensively compared three mechanisms of scarcity pricing, capacity market and capacity subsidy electrovalence in terms of basic principles, overall framework and core systems, advantages and disadvantages of mechanisms and applicable conditions. Focusing on the capacity market, the paper also compared three types of market models including decentralized model, centralized model and reliable options model, proposed a basic framework system with the capacity quota, qualification examination and market transaction as the core system, and studied the auction system design and capacity demand curve calculation method for various markets. In addition, the paper introduced the principle and methods for checking the capacity electricity price and adequacy capacity in Chile, and discussed the limitations of scarcity pricing mechanism in social and political aspects and the dilemma of supervision. Finally, some suggestions are put forward for staged construction of capacity adequacy guarantee mechanism in China, which are suitable for the construction and development of China's electricity market.

Key words: electricity market, generation capacity adequacy, capacity compensation mechanism, scarcity pricing, capacity market, capacity subsidy electrovalence

HUANG Haitao, XU Jiadan, GUO Zhigang, JIN Jianbo. International Practice of Generation Capacity Adequacy Guarantee Mechanism and Its Implications for China’s Electricity Market[J]. Electric Power, 2023, 56(1): 68-76.

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URL: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202205004

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/Y2023/V56/I1/68

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