投资界面延伸下电网接入工程投资博弈策略

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202303083

中国电力 ›› 2024, Vol. 57 ›› Issue (2): 226-234.DOI: 10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202303083

• 技术经济 • 上一篇

投资界面延伸下电网接入工程投资博弈策略

曹艺琼¹(), 王学杰¹(), 田鑫²(), 林可尧³(), 胡臻达⁴(), 赵会茹¹()

1. 华北电力大学经济与管理学院，北京　102206
2. 国网能源研究院有限公司，北京　102209
3. 国网福建省电力有限公司，福建福州　350001
4. 国网福建省电力有限公司经济技术研究院，福建福州　350011

收稿日期:2023-03-17 接受日期:2023-10-07 出版日期:2024-02-28 发布日期:2024-02-28
作者简介:曹艺琼（2000—），女，硕士研究生，从事电网投资分析，E-mail：yiqiongcao@163.com
赵会茹（1963—），女，通信作者，教授，博士生导师，从事电力市场理论及应用技术等研究，E-mail：zhaohuiru@ncepu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家电网有限公司科技项目（适应公司高质量发展的电网投资效率效益提升的关键技术研究，1300-202157362A-0-0-00）。

Investment Game Strategy for Power Access Projects under Extension of Investment Interface

Yiqiong CAO¹(), Xuejie WANG¹(), Xin TIAN²(), Keyao LIN³(), Zhenda HU⁴(), Huiru ZHAO¹()

1. School of Economic and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
2. State Grid Energy Research Institute Co., Ltd., Beijing 102209, China
3. State Grid Fujian Electric Power Co., Ltd., Fuzhou 350001, China
4. Economic and Technical Research Institute of State Grid Fujian Electric Power Co., Ltd., Fuzhou 350011, China

Received:2023-03-17 Accepted:2023-10-07 Online:2024-02-28 Published:2024-02-28
Supported by:
This work is supported by the Science and Technology Project of SGCC (Research on Key Technologies for Improving Efficiency for Power Grid Investment to Adapt to High-quality Development of SGCC, No.1300-202157362A-0-0-00).

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为切实降低用户办电成本，电网投资界面被要求延伸至用户红线，而其延伸成本如何在政府、电网、用户多主体间分配尚缺乏统一合理的标准。基于此，首先阐述电网投资界面延伸情况及投资主体利益诉求，并对电网接入工程投资成本进行分析；其次，以最大化各主体投资比例与其最不理想比例差距为目标，构建Nash-Harsanyi讨价还价博弈模型，通过初始投资比例、风险分担比例、合作协同能力量化谈判力水平，为电力接入费用寻求公平合理的政企共担投资策略；最后，以某经济开发区电网接入工程为例进行算例分析，结果表明，电网、用户、政府投资比例由0.65∶0.14∶0.21优化为0.61∶0.12∶0.27，三者满意度均得以提升，其中电网企业由于较高的谈判力得到最大程度提升，这有助于推动电网投资界面延伸工作，进一步优化营商环境。

关键词: 电网接入工程, 政企共担机制, 投资策略优化, Nash-Harsanyi讨价还价, 合作博弈

Abstract:

In order to effectively reduce the cost of power supply for users, the grid investment interface is required to extend to the user's red line. However, there is no uniform and reasonable standard on how to allocate the extension cost among the government, power grid enterprises and users. This paper firstly expounds the extension of the power grid investment interface and the interest demands of investment entities, and analyzes the investment cost of power access project. Secondly, aiming at maximizing the gap between the investment proportion of each entity and its least ideal proportion, the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining game model is constructed. The bargaining power is quantified through the initial investment proportion, risk sharing ratio and cooperation ability, so as to seek a fair and reasonable government-enterprise sharing strategy for power access costs. Finally, a study is conducted for a power access project in an economic development zone. The results show that the investment proportion among power grid enterprise, users, and government has been optimized from 0.65∶0.14∶0.21 to 0.61∶0.12∶0.27, and the satisfaction degree of all three entities has been improved. The satisfaction degree of power grid enterprise has been greatly improved due to its high bargaining power, which is helpful to promote the extension of the investment interface and further optimize the business environment.

Key words: power access project, government-enterprise sharing mechanism, investment strategy optimization, Nash-Harsanyi bargaining, cooperative game

曹艺琼, 王学杰, 田鑫, 林可尧, 胡臻达, 赵会茹. 投资界面延伸下电网接入工程投资博弈策略[J]. 中国电力, 2024, 57(2): 226-234.

Yiqiong CAO, Xuejie WANG, Xin TIAN, Keyao LIN, Zhenda HU, Huiru ZHAO. Investment Game Strategy for Power Access Projects under Extension of Investment Interface[J]. Electric Power, 2024, 57(2): 226-234.

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链接本文: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/CN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202303083

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/CN/Y2024/V57/I2/226

图/表 9

图 1 电网接入工程投资界面示意

Fig.1 Investment interface diagram of power access project

表 1 某地经济开发区10 kV业扩配套项目相关参数

Table 1 Relevant parameters of a 10 kV industrial expansion supporting project in an economic development zone

$ \xi $/%	$ {V_0} $	$ M $	$ J $	$ F $
5	200000	3	23895.45	4

$ B $	$ X $	$ {E_k} $	$ K $	$ P $
750	10	1020	18	2.4×10⁷

$ Q $	$ \mu $/%	$ \delta $/%	$ {V_m} $$ ({V_1}/{V_2}/{V_3}) $	$ {S_m} $$ ({S_1}/{S_2}/{S_3}) $
44	2	4	100/300/400	70/270/240

$ {p_{\text{t}}} $	$ \lambda $	$ {\varphi ^m} $$ ({\varphi ^1}/{\varphi ^2}/{\varphi ^3}) $	$ {\delta ^m} $$ ({\delta ^1}/{\delta ^2}/{\delta ^3}) $	$ {L_m} $$ ({L_1}/{L_2}/{L_3}) $
0.6	28	2%/3%/4%	0.1%/3.5%/0.4%	0.065/2.527/0.307

$ {I_f} $
1		2	3	4
36548.25		352.19	1776.38	319.5

$ {Y_f} $
1		2	3	4
4		16	8	8

表 2 电网接入工程风险分担情况

Table 2 Risk allocation of power access project

工程风险	权重系数	风险分担比例
工程风险	权重系数	电网	用户	政府
建设风险	0.26	0.65	0.1	0.25
质量风险	0.38	0.33	0.52	0.15
市场风险	0.24	0.44	0.46	0.10
政策风险	0.12	0.17	0.13	0.70

表 3 各投资主体的合作协同能力情况

Table 3 Cooperation ability of each investment entity

合作协同种类	重要程度	合作协同能力
合作协同种类	重要程度	电网	用户	政府
技术竞争	0.50	0.75	0.10	0.15
资金支付	0.30	0.45	0.20	0.35
资源供应	0.20	0.15	0.35	0.50

图 2 电网接入工程投资比例优化情况

Fig.2 Investment proportion optimization for power access project

表 4 谈判前后各投资主体的满意度情况

Table 4 The satisfaction degree of all investment entities before and after negotiation

投资主体	谈判前满意度	谈判后满意度	变化程度/%
电网	3.41	20.75	+508
用户	0.56	0.73	+31
政府	1.00	1.21	+21

图 3 电网谈判初始点改变引起投资比例变化程度

Fig.3 The change degree of investment proportion due to the change of initial point of power grid negotiation

图 4 大波动情景下投资主体满意度提升水平

Fig.4 Satisfaction improvement of investment entities under large fluctuation scenarios

图 5 电网谈判力改变引起投资比例变化程度

Fig.5 The change degree of investment proportion due to the change of power grid's negotiation power

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Investment Game Strategy for Power Access Projects under Extension of Investment Interface

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