Design of Asymmetric Regulatory Framework for Electricity Distribution Companies

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201907101

Abstract

Abstract: The supervision of China's electricity retail market is still in an incomplete and defective stage. With the rapid liberalization of electricity retail market and the orderly liberalization of incremental distribution business to social capital, the new electricity distribution companies not only operate the distribution business in the incremental distribution area, but also compete with independent companies in the retail market. It has formed a vertically integrated monopolistic market position, and it is urgent to conduct asymmetric regulation on the distribution companies and their associated retail companies to facilitate the survival and development of independent electricity retail companies.This paper analyzes the business characteristics and changes of business sector of distribution companies which are different from traditional power supply enterprises. Combining with specific business analysis, it discusses six kinds of unfair competition behaviors, such as resource subsidy, price discrimination and non-price discrimination which may occur in vertical monopoly of the distribution companies. Subsequently, based on the asymmetric regulation theories, the paper studies the asymmetric regulatory framework and contents of distribution companies and their related electricity sales business from five aspects:finance, tariff, power supply services, infrastructure and business isolation.

Key words: electricity retail market, electricity distribution company, independent electricity retail company, asymmetric supervision, anti-monopoly, electricity distribution &retail business

CLC Number:

ZHANG Xiang, HONG Xiaofeng, HUANG Guori, HAN Shiqi. Design of Asymmetric Regulatory Framework for Electricity Distribution Companies[J]. Electric Power, 2019, 52(11): 159-166.

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URL: https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201907101

https://www.electricpower.com.cn/EN/Y2019/V52/I11/159

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