含用户聚合代理的工业园区需求响应主从博弈机制与策略

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201908008

中国电力 ›› 2020, Vol. 53 ›› Issue (8): 40-49.DOI: 10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201908008

• 综合能源配用电关键技术专栏 • 上一篇下一篇

含用户聚合代理的工业园区需求响应主从博弈机制与策略

李章溢¹, 马昕², 裴玮², 张亮¹, 刘明爽¹, 梁秋洪¹

1. 欣旺达电子股份有限公司，广东深圳 518108;
2. 中国科学院电工研究所，北京 100190

收稿日期:2019-08-01 修回日期:2019-10-12 发布日期:2020-08-05
作者简介:李章溢(1976-),男,硕士,高级工程师,从事综合能源系统运营研究,E-mail:lzy@sunwoda.com;马昕(1994-),女,硕士研究生,从事综合能源系统优化运行与互动博弈等研究,E-mail:maxin_mail@163.com;裴玮(1982-),男,通信作者,研究员(教授级),从事分布式发电与微网、交直流配网等研究,E-mail:peiwei@mail.iee.ac.cn
基金资助:
深圳市科技计划技术攻关项目(JSGG20180507183525619)；国家重点研发计划资助项目(2017YFB0903400)

Leader-Follower Game Mechanism and Strategy of Industrial Park Demand Response with User Aggregator

LI Zhangyi¹, MA Xin², PEI Wei², ZHANG Liang¹, LIU Mingshuang¹, LIANG Qiuhong¹

1. Sunwoda Electronic Co., Ltd., Shenzhen 518108, China;
2. Institute of Electrical Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China

Received:2019-08-01 Revised:2019-10-12 Published:2020-08-05
Supported by:
This work is supported by Shenzhen Science and Technology Program Key Technology Projects (No.JSGG20180507183525619) and the National Key Research and Development Program of China (No.2017YFB0903400)

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 区域综合能源系统中不同的利益主体往往具有多样化的优化目标和供用能需求，特别是聚合代理新型电力交易主体的出现，使得电能交易的相关调控策略和决策机制更加复杂，引入以价格为主导的博弈机制来协调均衡多方利益的对立是一个必然的趋势。考虑到能源交易过程中的先后次序和波动性变化等，基于Stackbelberg博弈理论和电力市场基本规则，提出了一种由用户聚合代理整合用户侧需求响应资源并与工业园区运营商互动的主从博弈电力市场机制模型，然后分析了工业园区和用户聚合代理的互动策略和博弈规则，并利用双层优化方法进行求解。通过优化分析验证了该机制在保证三方的经济利益下，同时能够改善用户聚合代理和企业用户在博弈中的弱势地位，对优化电力市场运营、降低大用户调峰成本和缓解电网压力具有重要意义。

关键词: 主从博弈, 电力市场, 用户聚合代理, 工业园区运营商, 需求响应

Abstract: In the regional integrated energy system, different stakeholders usually have various optimization objectives and supply energy demands. In particular, the appearance of multiple novel power transaction subjects makes it more sophisticated for controlling strategies and decision-making mechanisms related to power transaction. As a result of that, it is an inevitable trend to bring in price-oriented gaming mechanism to balance the gap among multiple benefits. Considering multiple stakeholders sequence and fluctuating changes in the energy trading process, a leader-follower electricity market mechanism model based on Stackelberg game theory and electricity market basic rules is brought out in this paper, in which user aggregators integrate demand resources and negotiate with industrial park operators. Then negotiating strategies and game rules between industrial park operators and user aggregators are analyzed by qualitative methods. Besides, two stage-optimization algorithms are used to solve this model. By the comparison and analysis of optimization results, it is verified that the proposed mechanism could guarantee the economic interests of the three parties as well as improve the weak positions of aggregators and enterprise users during gaming mechanism. Therefore, it is of great significance for electricity market operation, reducing the peaking cost of large users and relieving the pressure on the power grid.

Key words: leader-follower gaming, electricity market, load aggregator ultra-supercritical unit, industrial park operator, demand response

李章溢, 马昕, 裴玮, 张亮, 刘明爽, 梁秋洪. 含用户聚合代理的工业园区需求响应主从博弈机制与策略[J]. 中国电力, 2020, 53(8): 40-49.

LI Zhangyi, MA Xin, PEI Wei, ZHANG Liang, LIU Mingshuang, LIANG Qiuhong. Leader-Follower Game Mechanism and Strategy of Industrial Park Demand Response with User Aggregator[J]. Electric Power, 2020, 53(8): 40-49.

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含用户聚合代理的工业园区需求响应主从博弈机制与策略

Leader-Follower Game Mechanism and Strategy of Industrial Park Demand Response with User Aggregator

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含用户聚合代理的工业园区需求响应主从博弈机制与策略

Leader-Follower Game Mechanism and Strategy of Industrial Park Demand Response with User Aggregator

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