中国电力 ›› 2019, Vol. 52 ›› Issue (12): 113-122.DOI: 10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.201908119

• 技术经济 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑用户需求的电价交叉补贴及社会福利计量研究

叶泽1,2, 姚军1,3, 吴永飞1,2, 何姣1,2   

  1. 1. 长沙理工大学 经济与管理学院, 湖南 长沙 410004;
    2. 湖南省现代企业管理研究中心, 湖南 长沙 410004;
    3. 国家电网公司财务资产部, 北京 100031
  • 收稿日期:2019-08-19 修回日期:2019-09-16 发布日期:2019-12-05
  • 作者简介:叶泽(1962-),男,教授,博士,从事电力经济研究,Email:yeze2003@qq.com;姚军(1979-),男,博士,高级工程师,从事电力经济研究,Email:13910310554@163.com;吴永飞(1990-),男,博士,讲师,从事电价理论研究,Email:960733052@qq.com;何姣(1986-),男,博士,讲师,从事电力市场研究,Email:1057320378@qq.com
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(18JJD790001);国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BJY059);湖南省教育厅科学研究项目(16K007);湖南省现代企业管理研究中心开放基金重点项目(17qgzd02)

Study on the Cross Subsidy of Electricity Price and the Measurement of Social Welfare Considering Residential Demand

YE Ze1,2, YAO Jun1,3, WU Yongfei1,2, HE Jiao1,2   

  1. 1. School of Economics & Management, Changsha University of Science & Technology, Changsha 410004, China;
    2. The Research Center of Modern Enterprises Management, Changsha 410004, China;
    3. Financial & Assets Department, State Grid Corporation of China, Beijing 100031, China
  • Received:2019-08-19 Revised:2019-09-16 Published:2019-12-05
  • Supported by:
    This work is supported by the project of the Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences of Ministry of Education (No.18JJD790001),the National Social Science Foundation (No.17BJY059),the Scientific Research Project of Hunan Education Department (No.16K007) and the Key Project of Open Fund of Hunan Modern Enterprise Management Research Center (No.17qgzd02).

摘要: 电价交叉补贴具有严重的非效率性和非公平性,其准确计量和对社会福利的影响直接关系到用户的电价水平以及交叉补贴解决机制的设计。电价交叉补贴计量的关键在于基准价格的核定,传统的以成本为基础的计量方法虽然考虑了电力企业的收支平衡,但并不是福利最优的定价结果。沿着需求定价的角度出发,以社会福利最大化为目标,构建了电价交叉补贴的计量模型,模型以用户需求定价和需求函数构建为主要工作。结果表明:交叉补贴和社会福利与用户的自价格弹性、交叉价格弹性以及管制机构的福利权重系数有关。最后,本文通过实证模型准确地计量了各类用户的自价格弹性以及交叉价格弹性,测算了我国电价交叉补贴和对应最优社会福利的大小,验证了模型的准确性和有效性。

关键词: 用户需求, 电价交叉补贴, 自价格弹性, 交叉价格弹性, 社会福利

Abstract: The current cross-subsidy of electricity price is quite inefficient and unfair, and its accuracy of measurement and influence on social welfare are directly related to the level of electricity price of users and the design of the cross-subsidy settlement mechanism. The key to the measurement of cross-subsidy of electricity price lies in the verification of the benchmark price. Although the traditional cost-based measurement method considers the balance of income and expenditure of power enterprises, it is not the pricing result of welfare optimum. Starting from the perspective of demand pricing and aiming at maximizing social welfare, this paper constructs a measurement model of electricity price cross-subsidy, which mainly focuses on the users' demands pricing and the construction of demand function. The results show that the cross-subsidy and social welfare are related to the users' self-price elasticity, cross-price elasticity and the welfare weight coefficient of the regulatory agency. Finally, this paper accurately measures the self-price elasticity and the cross-price elasticity of various kinds of users through the empirical model, calculates the cross-subsidy of electricity price and the corresponding optimal social welfare, and verifies the accuracy and effectiveness of the proposed model.

Key words: users' demand, cross-subsidy, self-price elasticity, cross price elasticity, social welfare

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