计及场景系数的车网互动收益研究

doi:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202101099

中国电力 ›› 2022, Vol. 55 ›› Issue (3): 28-36.DOI: 10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202101099

计及场景系数的车网互动收益研究

程宏波, 郭源曦, 商子轩, 李云枭

华东交通大学电气与自动化工程学院，江西南昌 330013

收稿日期:2021-01-20 修回日期:2021-12-23 出版日期:2022-03-28 发布日期:2022-03-29
作者简介:程宏波（1979—），男，通信作者，博士，教授，从事输变电设备（包括牵引供电设备）健康管理、故障诊断及预测、电网智能控制等研究，E-mail：waitingbo@126.com;郭源曦（1995—），男，硕士研究生，从事车网互动收益分析研究，E-mail：guoyuanxi0122 @163.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（基于博弈论的车-网双向互动策略研究，51667008）

Study of Vehicle-to-Grid Interaction Income Considering Scenario Coefficient

CHENG Hongbo, GUO Yuanxi, SHANG Zixuan, LI Yunxiao

School of Electrical and Automation Engineering, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013, China

Received:2021-01-20 Revised:2021-12-23 Online:2022-03-28 Published:2022-03-29
Supported by:
This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Study of Interaction of Electric Vehicles and Smart Grid Based on Game Theory, No.51667008)

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 动态变化的电网对功率需求的紧急程度不同，不同紧急程度下车网互动所产生的收益也有所区别。为实现更加合理的互动收益分配，提出一种考虑电网场景区别的车网互动收益分配方法。通过场景系数反映电网功率需求紧急程度的不同，结合辅助服务等效替代分析车网互动的收益；考虑不同电价下电动汽车用户的响应概率，建立改进的讨价还价博弈模型以求解场景最优响应电价，从而得到互动双方的收益分配值。通过算例对比分析几种响应策略的负荷削减程度、收益及分配方式的公平熵值等评价因素，验证了该收益分配模型的有效性与优越性。

关键词: 车网互动, 场景系数, 改进讨价还价博弈模型, 收益分配, 公平性评价

Abstract: As the urgency degree of the grid demand for power varies due to the dynamic change of the grid, the income generated by vehicle-to-grid (V2G) interaction also differs under different urgency degrees. To achieve a more reasonable distribution of the interaction income, this paper proposed a distribution method of the V2G interaction income that considers the difference in the power grid scenario. The scenario coefficient is used to reflect the urgency degree of the grid demand for power, and equivalent substitution of ancillary services is discussed to analyze the V2G interaction income. The response probability of electric vehicle users under different electricity prices is taken into account and an improved bargaining game model is built to solve the electricity price for the optimal scenario response and thereby obtain the income distribution shares of the two sides participating in the V2G interaction. The effectiveness and superiority of the proposed income distribution model are verified through the comparative case analysis of the load reduction degree, income, and fair entropy of the distribution method among several response strategies.

Key words: V2G interaction, scenario coefficient, improved bargaining game model, income distribution, fairness evaluation

程宏波, 郭源曦, 商子轩, 李云枭. 计及场景系数的车网互动收益研究[J]. 中国电力, 2022, 55(3): 28-36.

CHENG Hongbo, GUO Yuanxi, SHANG Zixuan, LI Yunxiao. Study of Vehicle-to-Grid Interaction Income Considering Scenario Coefficient[J]. Electric Power, 2022, 55(3): 28-36.

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计及场景系数的车网互动收益研究

Study of Vehicle-to-Grid Interaction Income Considering Scenario Coefficient

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