Abstract: As China's carbon market gradually explores and implements a paid allocation mechanism for carbon quotas, higher requirements will be imposed on thermal power enterprises regarding their low-carbon transition and the improvement of carbon compliance capabilities. Based on evolutionary game theory, this study investigates the evolutionary pathways of low-carbon behavioral decisions of thermal power enterprises under the paid carbon quota auction mechanism, and employs sensitivity analysis to elucidate how key parameters affect their behavioral strategies. The results show that the evolutionary game model has three stable equilibrium strategies, and the evolutionary equilibrium evolves toward different stable strategies with changes in the carbon quota auction proportion, the emission reduction rate of low-carbon retrofits, and retrofit costs. By scientifically setting the auction proportion, the government can transmit emission reduction constraints via carbon prices, and thereby guide thermal power enterprises to carry out low-carbon retrofits. When the auction proportion reaches 0.2, thermal power enterprises exhibit a stronger propensity to adopt low-carbon technological retrofits. These findings can provide a reference for optimizing the carbon market quota allocation system and improving incentive policies for emission-controlled enterprises.